CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDREDTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 3 March 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mrs. Hisami Kurokochi (Japan)

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INDIANA UNIVERSITY

DEPT.

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 700th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, allow me to extend, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, a cordial welcome to His Excellency the Deputy State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Ambassador André Erdös, who will address the Conference today. His presence among us today is greatly appreciated and I am sure we all await his statement with interest.

I also have on my list of speakers the representatives of Norway and Indonesia. Once we have gone through the list of speakers, I intend to take up for decision the request by Kazakhstan to participate in our work.

Before giving the floor to the speakers inscribed for today, I should like, with your indulgence, to make a few opening remarks as Japan takes over the presidency of the Conference.

At the outset, allow me to express my appreciation to my predecessor, Ambassador Vattani of Italy, and all other delegations who have welcomed me so kindly into their midst and for the greetings extended to me. Having assumed my duties as representative of Japan and President of the Conference only a short while ago, I am fully conscious of the challenges ahead of me. I am confident that my task will be made lighter in the knowledge that I can depend on the advice, cooperation and assistance of my predecessor, the incoming President, group coordinators and China, as well as all other delegations and the secretariat.

As previous speakers have pointed out repeatedly in this forum, 1995 is an important year. It marks, in particular, the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The coming Sunday, 5 March, marks the day on which the NPT came into force 25 years ago. Hence in less than seven weeks from now, the parties to the Treaty will meet to decide its future, namely whether the Treaty will continue in force indefinitely or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. With the NPT review and extension Conference fast approaching, the attention of the international community is more and more focused on the work of this Conference on Disarmament. My predecessor Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka stated in his farewell address to the Conference that he was proud to have been a part of the CD. For my part, I hope to be able to say that I have had a good and productive four weeks when I hand over the presidency. Therefore, I pledge to my distinguished colleagues that I will do my best to discharge my challenging duties as President of the Conference with a view to achieving as much progress as possible in our work before the NPT Conference, and I hope to have constructive consultations with all delegations, especially through group coordinators, as well as with ad hoc committee chairmen and special coordinators to be appointed.

As the NPT is too important an issue to be passed by undiscussed, I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to state the Japanese view on this important treaty - in particular, why the Government of Japan decided to

(The President)

support the indefinite extension of the treaty, as was reaffirmed by Mr. Yohei Kono, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the United Nations General Assembly last September.

The vast majority of the world's States have become parties to the NPT. There are now 172 States parties. The NPT is crucial to our collective security and supplies a series of irreplaceable benefits, as follows. First, the NPT enhances regional and global security. Because of the NPT there is a legal basis for responses to the challenges to regional and global security posed by the violators of the Treaty. There would have been no legal basis in the absence of the NPT for the actions of the Security Council when Iraq's nuclear programme came to light. Because the nuclear issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is heading for a solution, the security of north-east Asia has been improved immeasurably. The practical and legal consequences of the NPT for national and regional security bear careful consideration.

Second, the NPT also sets out an agenda on behalf of global peace and security, in particular nuclear disarmament. The NPT is not a static arrangement. Article VI provides for dynamic progress that seeks the ultimate eradication of the category of nuclear-weapon States by the progressive elimination of nuclear weapons. Thereby, the NPT enshrines a principle of paramount importance, namely that all States parties, including the non-nuclear-weapon States, are required to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". In addition, article VI sets out an agenda for achievement by all States parties of the ideal of "general and complete disarmament". Because of the NPT's article VI, meaningful negotiations towards a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty are proceeding in this Conference on Disarmament. Similarly, efforts to begin negotiations on a cut-off treaty are in train here. As a result of Ukraine's accession to the NPT, START I has entered into force, and the Russian Federation and the United States have commenced preparations for the ratification of START II.

Third, the NPT provides assurances of the peaceful nature of national nuclear programmes. These assurances are provided through article III, which underpins the safeguards procedures administered by IAEA. Less than the full-scope safeguards do not provide the same measures of assurance. The NPT enshrines principles - in this case with regard to the application of safeguards and mechanisms to ensure responsible behaviour - that add to the security of the international community.

Fourth, the NPT established a principle in favour of the transfer of nuclear materials and technologies. Article IV of the NPT establishes a principle that is of genuine benefit, namely that all countries are to gain from the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and technologies.

Fifth, the NPT reinforces nuclear-weapon-free zones. Article VII of the NPT provides another substantial benefit to States parties - it provides a legal under-pinning to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs).

(The President)

The norms of behaviour that NWFZs establish are significantly reinforced by the norm against the proliferation of nuclear weapons generally that is established by the NPT. Article VII lends credibility to NWFZs.

As mentioned above, without the NPT there would be no credible barrier to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, there would be no legal injunction favouring nuclear disarmament or the other benefits the treaty supplies. The significance of the NPT for the security of the international community is such that in the event that it should become no longer effective we would have no choice but to start its re-negotiation as soon as possible. It is highly doubtful that such negotiations would result in the full measure of the benefits that the NPT currently supplies.

For these reasons Japan decided to support the indefinite extension of the NPT. Of course, the Government of Japan is determined to contribute to the promotion of nuclear disarmament to which the States parties to the NPT have committed themselves. In this context I recall that the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated in his message to the Conference delivered at the beginning of this year's session that "further progress in the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation is no longer beyond the reach of reality. I believe that this will enable other nuclear-weapon States to move the process of nuclear disarmament forward and make yet another contribution to the establishment of a safer world".

I should now like to share with you the Japanese views on the disarmament agenda items before us. With respect to a CTBT, my predecessor, as his last endeavour in the CD, urged the delegations to redouble their efforts to conclude the treaty as soon as possible. I simply endorse his statement and hope that further tangible progress will be made soon. Japan also attaches importance to the commencement of the negotiations on a cut-off treaty. I look forward to hearing a heartening report from Ambassador Shannon of Canada. With respect to the issue of negative security assurances (NSA), I hope that the accomplishments in NSA and possibly also in PSA (positive security assurances) will be achieved soon. Arms control and disarmament in the field of conventional weapons is also important. As a first step towards fully addressing this issue, Japan took the initiative jointly with the European countries in establishing the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The Register has witnessed a promising start. Japan hopes that its participation will be widened steadily so as to promote confidence-building on a global basis. Likewise we attach importance to discussing transparency in armaments in the CD. Of course, the Japanese delegation is ready to discuss with other delegations the issues relating to conventional weapons in general. As regards the issue of prevention of an arms race in outer space, we are willing to listen to the views of other delegations with a view to finding a way to proceed with this issue.

Last but not least, we should seek progress in the issues of the agenda and the expansion of the CD. Japan particularly attaches importance to early realization of a substantial expansion of the Conference, in view, in particular, of the overdue aspirations of the applicants for membership as well as their contributions to the work of the Conference.

(The President)

Having said all this in my national capacity, I pledge myself to be as impartial and accommodating as possible as your President, and I am determined to do my best for the purpose of achieving our common objectives. I look forward to enjoying positive cooperation from all of you.

I should now like to give the floor to His Excellency the Deputy State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Ambassador André Erdös.

Mr. ERDÖS (Hungary): Madam President, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the high post of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Our congratulations also go to your predecessor, Ambassador Alessandro Vattani of Italy, for his skilful guidance of our activities during the crucial starting phase of the 1995 session, which enabled the Conference to resume it substantive work at an early stage. I also extend our greetings to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force on 5 March 1970. It is a special occasion to address the Conference on Disarmament on the eve of this important anniversary. In spite of - and, I might add, because of - the profound transformation in recent years of the agenda for a new international security system, the NPT continues to be the major international legal instrument that provides a basic guarantee for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide. We are deeply convinced that the international community cannot fail to ensure that the NPT prevails and remains an essential part of the emerging new system of international relations. Hungary is thus keenly interested in strengthening the Treaty and in making it of unlimited duration without linking this act to additional conditions. My Government is ready to contribute to achieving this important goal.

We cannot but note with great satisfaction that the universality of the Treaty has significantly been enhanced through the recent accession of a number of countries, notably Ukraine, Algeria and Argentina. We consider the decision of Ukraine in this regard as a most encouraging event strengthening stability in our region and reinforcing our expectation that no additional nuclear-weapon States will emerge on the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The international community has become more attentive to the risks of proliferation of all categories of weapons of mass destruction and has shown its determination to act against those risks at both global and regional levels. Hungary, acting as Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe for 1995, will do its best in order to use the potential of this regional arrangement to promote the goal of non-proliferation. In this respect, OSCE participating States can draw on the decision on principles governing non-proliferation, which is an integral part of the Budapest Document adopted by the heads of State and government at the CSCE summit in December 1994. In it, the participating States expressed their strong belief that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and

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missiles to deliver them, poses a threat to international peace, security and stability. In this context, they expressed their strong commitment that the NPT should be fully implemented, indefinitely and unconditionally extended. They spoke out against the acquisition, development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons.

The OSCE member States are also committed to control the transfer of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and their components and technology. They undertook to control the export of such items in accordance with the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the annexes to them, and to encourage efforts to ensure that interested participating States become adherents to MTCR. This comprehensive programme of action of OSCE proves that regional arrangements under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations have an important role to play in enhancing the effectiveness of endeavours undertaken at the global level in the field of non-proliferation.

1995 is widely expected to be an exceptional year not only for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but also from the point of view of positive developments in other related fields. There is no doubt that the success of the present session of the Conference on Disarmament will be judged on the basis of the progress this body is able to achieve in the course of its negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Hungary disagrees with the proposition seeking to establish rigid linkages between the unlimited extension of the NPT and achievements in other negotiations. At the same time, the overall trend of the work of the Conference these days will certainly contribute to creating a favourable international environment for the upcoming review and extension Conference. In this context Hungary would like to put on record her utmost interest in achieving in the NTB Ad Hoc Committee as much progress as possible during the remaining weeks of the first part of the 1995 session.

Speaking more broadly, we also hope that by the end of the year the members of the Conference on Disarmament will be able to find compromises on such contentious issues as scope and basic obligations, entry into force, duration or on-site inspections and the related trigger mechanism, just to mention the most important ones. Decisions on mutually acceptable concessions are not always easy to take but they are inevitable if we are to succeed. We may need further initiatives and new approaches aimed at speeding up the course of negotiations. The decision of the United States to drop its proposal for a special right to withdraw from the CTBT is a good example to this effect which, hopefully, will set a pattern of responsible and flexible attitude on behalf of a nuclear Power in the ongoing NTB process. We call on delegations to further contribute to concerted actions on issues yet unresolved.

As Hungary has already outlined several times, our basic objective is to have an effective treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The Hungarian position is that the goals and purposes of this legal instrument can best be promoted and implemented through a self-contained organization, which, however, will draw on the expertise and the existing infrastructure of a major international organization, namely IAEA. The possible co-location of the two

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organizations deserves our most serious consideration. It follows from the aforesaid that my Government has a strong preference for Vienna as the seat of the future CTBT organization. We welcome the offer of the Government of Austria to this end.

Another CTBT-related issue is the question of the funding of the international monitoring system (IMS) consisting of facilities established and run jointly or nationally by the member States. The experience of other international organizations in the field of financing tells us that there is a wide range of possibilities to elaborate a cost-sharing formula accommodating various concerns and tailored to the capacity of individual States to cover the expenses. The Hungarian delegation is open to any solution which ensures equitable burden-sharing and clearly defines the obligations of the organization, on the one hand, and those of the individual States hosting IMS facilities, on the other.

Another aspect of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation my Government attaches great importance to is the prohibition of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. The lack, in certain States, of accountancy and physical protection systems meeting international standards has given rise to increasing diversion and illicit traffic in sensitive weapon-grade material. It is against this background that Hungary advocates the early establishment of an ad hoc committee on "cut-off". The activities of the Friend of the Chair, Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, deserve our highest appreciation and further support. In our view, a mandate based on United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L, co-sponsored by Hungary, could provide an appropriate point of departure for the future negotiations.

While concentrating carefully on the nuclear test ban, and, as we hope, on "cut-off" in parallel, other items on the agenda should not be rendered insignificant, either. I take this opportunity to reaffirm my country's position that States renouncing the nuclear option in an internationally and legally binding form and acting in full compliance with their obligations have a legitimate right to be assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In our view, the optimum format for security assurances would be a legally binding, multilaterally negotiated international agreement. Such a legal instrument, by nature, will have to be based on mutual obligations by both the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon ones. We regard the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances as an appropriate negotiating forum and are prepared to contribute to its work, once re-established.

The item of transparency in armaments was high on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament last year. We firmly believe that such a crucial issue cannot be treated the way it has been. It is so not only because transparency and openness should be of high priority in the new security environment of the post-cold-war era. The Conference on Disarmament has at least two additional reasons and incentives to continue to tackle this issue in an Ad Hoc Committee. The first, in our view, is the obvious imbalance between nuclear- and conventional-weapons-related items in the deliberations of the CD. This situation is most unjustified when the real threat of a nuclear war between the great Powers has clearly receded and the number of

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regional conflicts fought by conventional weapons has dramatically increased. Secondly, the Conference cannot afford to lose the momentum of the relevant discussions over the last three years on the many proposals submitted in a great number of working papers still awaiting consideration. Due to the limited time available, most of the ideas contained in these documents could not have been considered in depth and, no doubt, merit further examination. The better understanding of the often diverging positions is also an asset the Conference can benefit from.

Two years ago, the international community took note with satisfaction of the fact that the Czech Republic and Slovakia were able to solve the problems arising from the dissolution of a State in a peaceful and civilized manner, which unfortunately has proved to be rather an exception than a rule in the post-cold-war era. The two States had practically no difficulties to be admitted to all those international organizations and forums where the former Czechoslovakia used to be a member. This was done either jointly or in accordance with their bilateral agreement. The only case when one of the successor States regrettably failed to receive this treatment and the seat of a country that parted into its constituent republics was the Conference on Disarmament. Last month the Conference could see an emerging consensus in this issue. In this situation, we once again urge delegations to consider the application of Slovakia favourably and materialize the prevailing political will for welcoming this country in our midst. The CD as an autonomous body is fully authorized to do so. By the solution of this question, the Conference could send a positive message to the international community demonstrating its ability to address membership issues in a flexible and constructive manner. The significant expansion of the membership of the CD, in our view, could not be postponed any more without running the risk of undermining its credibility. The early admission of new members could facilitate the more effective implementation of the legal instruments elaborated by this body. Hungary is prepared to consider favourably the admission of all States which have registered their candidacy in due form. Alternatively, we are also open to start the process of expansion on the basis of any agreed and balanced list commanding consensus or in any other appropriate manner. In our view, the Conference on Disarmament should live up, in all respects, to the expectations focused on its activities by the international community.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Deputy State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Norway, Ambassador Skogmo.

Mr. SKOGMO (Norway): Madam President, first of all, I would like to congratulate you, Ambassador Kurokochi, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this crucial period for global disarmament. The Conference is charged by the international community to negotiate agreement on the important global disarmament issues before us, foremost among them a nuclear-test-ban treaty. The aspirations of a growing number of nations seeking membership, now outnumbering the actual members, also bear witness to the importance of the Conference on Disarmament. I pledge my delegation's full support to your efforts to move ahead on the issues before us. I also take this opportunity to congratulate

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Ambassador Dembinski on his election to the Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB, as well as the working group chairmen, Ambassador Norberg of Sweden and Ambassador Ramaker of the Netherlands. They will also need the wholehearted support of all delegations in order to make speedy progress toward a negotiated text for the CTBT.

The primary objective of the Conference on Disarmament must now be to conclude negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty as soon as possible. We are pleased that the CD managed to get off to a good start for the CTBT negotiations this year. But this does not mean that we can neglect other issues on the agenda of the Conference. Norway believes that the Conference should re-establish the ad hoc groups from last year, and make every effort to launch negotiations on a cut-off convention. In our view, momentum gained in one area could have positive effects in others, particularly as many of the subjects are related. It is both possible and necessary to initiate negotiations on other issues before the Conference, while we maintain a special focus on those issues which are most pressing.

The political focus in 1995 will be on the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. My Government believes the NPT forms the most important element in the barrier against nuclear proliferation. The NPT helps to provide stability in international security both on a global and on a regional level. For this reason it deserves to be extended indefinitely, without any preconditions or linkages, and should become a truly universal treaty. Norway has for many years held the view that a CTBT will supplement and strengthen the NPT. Visible progress towards a CTBT in the months ahead, with a view to speedy conclusion and entry into force, will be a logical and politically important complement to the NPT. In this context, negative security assurances provided jointly by the nuclear-weapons States will also be an important supplement to the NPT. We hope that tangible NSAs will be provided by the nuclear-weapon States before the beginning of the NPT review and extension meeting in April.

The CTBT negotiations are making welcome progress. The rolling text is now into its second reading, although important substantial issues remain to be tackled. The ad hoc group under the chairmanship of Ambassadors Marín Bosch and Dembinski has been making steady headway. Technically difficult verification issues have been clarified. Agreement seems to be at hand on the basic verification methods, thanks in large extent to the persistent efforts by Dr. Peter Marshall and his team of experts, as well as by Dr. Ola Dahlman and the Group of Scientific Experts.

The scope of the Treaty is obviously a key issue. Norway's position on scope remains unchanged. We believe that a test-ban treaty should prohibit all nuclear explosions in all environments. The definitions in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 provide, in our opinion, a goods basis for the CTBT definitions, with the necessary addition of underground explosions. The verification system would be based on at least four agreed methods, with the possible complement of others. We agree that a system based on seismological methods, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide monitoring would give a satisfactory basis for ensuring compliance with the treaty. The system should be configured with a view to establishing cost-effective coverage to pick up

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realistic explosion levels, that is, larger than 1 kiloton. Synergies between the various methods should be exploited to the extent possible in order to bring down costs for installation and operation.

The GSETT-3 experiment, with broad participation, is now up and running. We understand that it is already delivering concrete results that can be directly used to assess the performance of the seismic component of a future international CTBT monitoring system. GSETT-3 will provide useful training for personnel around the world in seismic verification skills and will give valuable experience in all aspects of the operation of a global monitoring system. We consider it very important to ensure a smooth transition from the operation of the GSETT-3 network to the network that will eventually serve to verify compliance with a future CTBT. Norway is contributing fully to GSETT-3 and is prepared to maintain this effort.

Let me underline one issue which is of particular importance to my country. Running expenses for the IDC and for the network that provides data for verification purposes should be carried by the parties on the basis of the United Nations scale of assessment. International funding for verification activities is important in order to ensure an equitable distribution of costs and to avoid placing unreasonable economic burdens on countries whose participation, for arbitrary geographical reasons, is essential for obtaining adequate global coverage. It would also facilitate the establishment of new seismic stations at appropriate locations and would help ensure that all stations and communication links can be operated to the required standards. Reliability and quality of the station network would also benefit from common funding and acquisition.

We have observed with great satisfaction the good cooperation that has developed over the last two years between dedicated experts and scientists that have been reinforcing the negotiating teams and the diplomatic negotiating framework of the CD, especially in the field of the CTBT. This tandem effort could in the future be emulated for other negotiating tasks facing the Conference. The next treaty on the CD's negotiating horizon should in our view be the conclusion of a convention on the cut-off of production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Regrettably, agreement on a negotiating mandate has so far eluded Ambassador Shannon's steady efforts as Special Coordinator to establish a consensus on this issue. We understand that the sticking-point is related to the extent of the scope of the negotiations. We would hope that the issue of present stocks of fissile material will not be the stumbling-block that upsets possible negotiations in the CD on a treaty to halt future production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

Norway agrees that the Conference on Disarmament has a special responsibility to deal with weapons of mass destruction, including the nuclear issues. My delegation finds it regrettable, and even surprising, that the acute problem of conventional disarmament is not dealt with directly by the CD, however. An increasing number of armed conflicts around the globe, with untold suffering to civil societies and the innocent civilian population, is fuelled by the proliferation and build-up of conventional armaments. Small arms proliferate with little government control. Land-mines maim civilians

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and make vast tracts of land unfit for cultivation for generations. Against this background it is surprising that the CD has yet to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on transparency in armaments, the only item on the CD agenda where conventional armaments are being addressed, albeit indirectly.

The problem of expansion of the Conference has been on the agenda for more than a decade, with no solution at hand. My country has twice in this period been on a short list of new members, believing each time that membership would follow quickly. Twice our accession has been hindered by a blocking of other nations on the short list. The General Assembly of the United Nations, which helped reform the present Conference on Disarmament, passed a consensus resolution last year (resolution 49/77 B), again pointing out the urgency of the CD finding a solution to the problem of expansion. My delegation feels it is time that the Conference in all seriousness address and solve the expansion question. A solution that pleases all may not be achievable in the short term. The Conference could nevertheless break the present impasse by considering admitting those countries on which there is agreement, while full admittance for all applicants could be phased over some time. I can reiterate the readiness of my country to take on the responsibilities that follow from membership in the CD, the only global negotiating forum for disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Norway for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the distinguished representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Brotodiningrat. However, before doing so, allow me to express the regret of this Conference at his imminent departure. In his nearly four years with the Conference, Ambassador Brotodiningrat has contributed in a significant way to the achievements of this forum. I have in mind, in particular, his active involvement in the final stages of the negotiation of the chemical weapons Convention, when he skilfully and tirelessly narrowed positions and brought a solution to the thorny issue of "old stocks", as well as his own presidency of the Conference last year, which was memorably polished, I understand. While taking this opportunity to wish Ambassador Brotodiningrat and his family every success and happiness for the future, I take it that I speak on behalf of everyone here in expressing our sense of loss at his departure. Ambassador Brotodiningrat, you have the floor.

Mr. BROTODININGRAT (Indonesia): Madam President, please allow me at the outset to warmly welcome you and, at the same time, to congratulate you upon your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. It is widely recognized that the early stage of the Conference's annual session is always very difficult. However, knowing your personal qualities I am fully confident that apart from the prompt establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on NTB, all the remaining issues listed in the Presidential statement of 31 January can soon be resolved. To this end, my delegation pledges its full cooperation in helping you to discharge your demanding tasks. I should also like to use this occasion to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Vattani of Italy, for the excellent manner with which he conducted our work during the previous month.

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

I am also pleased that, while counting my few remaining days in Geneva, I still have the opportunity to welcome our newly arrived colleagues, the distinguished Ambassadors from Brazil, China, Morocco and Myanmar, representing countries with which Indonesia enjoys excellent relations. We trust that they will bring with them fresh ideas and a renewed positive spirit that will be most beneficial in revamping even further the work and productivity of the Conference.

At a time when I am about to take leave from the Conference on Disarmament, I am overwhelmed by mixed feelings. Looking back at the past, I cannot but feel gratified to share the pride of the Conference for its major achievement, namely the successful conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention, a success which I hope will soon be completed by the required enabling ratification. On the other hand, the past has also unfortunately left me with a sense of discouragement, particularly when it comes to some unfinished business such as the problem of membership expansion, the question of the agenda and the quest for improved and effective functioning of the Conference. I can only wish that collective wisdom and common resolve will soon prevail within the Conference to settle these issues.

Turning to the present, I feel it is somewhat regrettable to have to leave the Conference precisely at a time when it is actively pursuing its major mandate to negotiate and conclude the absolutely essential CTBT. The great importance that Indonesia attaches to a CTBT is well known, so that the very least I can do at this juncture is to express the earnest hope that the Conference will succeed in concluding the CTBT in the very near future. For failing to do so could bring us back to the not so distant past when the use, or threat of use, of these horrendous weapons brought the world so close to the danger of conflagration.

Regrettably, I am also going to miss other major events in disarmament, in particular the review and extension Conference of the NPT. On this I can only anxiously await from afar the good news that finally the international community has reached a consensus on this crucially important matter.

To conclude, allow me to take this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude to all my distinguished colleagues and dear friends for their cooperation and friendship during my term representing Indonesia in the Conference on Disarmament. I assure them that all the wisdom I have had the privilege to absorb from them has made my three and half years' assignment in Geneva a most rewarding one, while their kindness has made it most enjoyable. In the same vein, I should not fail to express my most sincere appreciation to the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General and to all the secretariat staff, not to forget the conference officers and interpreters, for their most valuable assistance, which has greatly facilitated the discharge of my duties. Finally, instead of bidding farewell, let me just say till we meet again, hopefully under even better circumstances.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement as well as for the kind words he has addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Madam President, as I welcome you among us I am delighted to see you presiding over the Conference on Disarmament. Your experience, the fact that you represent a great country, the fact that you are looking at things with a new eye, all auger well for success in your important task. You may therefore be sure of the full support and friendship of the French delegation. I would also like to pay very special tribute to my friend Ambassador Alessandro Vattani for the exemplary way, the intelligence, the courage and the competence with which he directed our work at a critical moment, in particularly difficult conditions, without ever losing his courtesy, his elegance and his natural humour. We thank him for this once again.

I wish to take the floor briefly to announce to the Conference on Disarmament that the Government of the French Republic, following a unanimous vote by the French Parliament, deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations yesterday, 2 March 1995, its instrument of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. France thus confirms the major importance it attaches to this Convention, which was opened for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993. The Conference on Disarmament can be proud of having been the architect of this first internationally verifiable multilateral disarmament treaty. France hopes that the Convention will be speedily ratified by all member and observer States in the Conference on Disarmament, so as to enable it to enter into force as quickly as possible. The implementation of this treaty will constitute a very important step forward in the field of disarmament and will strengthen international peace and security.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement and also for bringing us this very good news. I now recognize the distinguished representative of Iraq, who has asked for the floor.

Mr. AL-KHERO (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): Madam Chairman, allow me to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference. My country's delegation is confident that you will conduct the work of the Conference in the best possible manner by virtue of your background and experience. In your statement about the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Madam, you dealt with the legal basis that this treaty provides in order to meet the challenges to regional and international security which are created by violations of this treaty, and you mentioned the Iraqi nuclear programme. You are aware that this programme has been destroyed in accordance with Security Council resolution 687, and here my country's delegation would like to point out that the legal basis provided by international conventions and treaties, including the non-proliferation Treaty, is not sufficient to maintain regional and international security if it is not accompanied by comprehensive application far removed from the double standards and selectivity which have been and are still being applied against my country. My country's delegation hopes that the international instruments will be respected in a comprehensive manner and that the spirit of the provisions and texts of such instruments and their legal interpretations will

(Mr. Al-Khero, Iraq)

be applied without being influenced by any specific political viewpoint. If we do this, then we will have established a sound basis for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Iraq for his statement and also for the kind words addressed to me. Are there any other speakers who wish to take the floor? I see none.

I should now like to take up the request from Kazakhstan to participate in the work of the Conference. Consultations have revealed that it would be acceptable to delegations to take up this request directly in a plenary meeting without going into an informal meeting, on the understanding that this does not create a precedent for future, similar requests. This request has been circulated to all delegations in document CD/WP.464, which is now before you. May I take it that the Conference accepts this request? I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The secretariat, at my request, has circulated a tentative revised timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference next week. It was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I consider that the timetable is acceptable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Thanks to the untiring efforts of my predecessor, Ambassador Vattani of Italy, the Conference was able to adopt its agenda and start, without delay, substantive work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I have the benefit of inheriting the accomplishments of the previous President. However, I am aware and concerned that important issues outlined in the Presidential statement of 3 February (CD/1294), covering the agenda and organization of the 1995 session, remain unresolved. In particular, we need to consider the possibility of re-establishing, as soon as possible, the ad hoc committees on negative security assurances, transparency in armaments and prevention of an arms race in outer space, as well as the possibility of establishing any other ad hoc committees which may be agreed on following further consultations. We will also need to appoint special coordinators on expansion of membership of the Conference as well as on review of the agenda. We should also bear in mind the question relating to consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. Further, as you are aware, Ambassador Shannon of Canada is actively seeking agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and I hope that his efforts will be rewarded by positive results. Finally, we will need to continue our consideration of the request made by the Slovak Republic for membership in the Conference. As you know, I have already started

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consultations on all of these issues and I can assure you that I will spare no effort in trying to bring about early agreement. At the same time, I would encourage individual delegations, as well as groups of delegations, to consult among themselves in order to bring about solutions acceptable to all. I hope that solutions can be found and that we succeed in addressing our differences through serious dialogue and cooperation with patience and in a spirit of understanding.

The next plenary meeting will be held on Thursday, 9 March 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.701
9 March 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 9 March 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mrs. Hisami Kurokchi (Japan)

GE.95-60862 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 701st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have no speaker inscribed for today. Nevertheless, may I ask whether any delegation wishes to speak at this stage? This does not seem to be the case.

As you are aware, the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal, will be leaving us very soon. I think it is only appropriate for me to pay a special tribute to someone who, for the last six years, has represented the views and interests of his Government with authority, talent and elegance while, at the same time, bringing to this Conference a vast experience coupled with a keen insight into the intricacies of negotiation itself. As you know, over the years Ambassador Kamal has indeed contributed to making this Conference more flexible in conducting its own business by finding, through the exercise in improved and effective functioning, ways and means of overcoming the rigidities inherent in our rules of procedure. Ambassador Kamal has earned the respect of all members of this Conference and his departure will indeed be felt as a loss. However, I am sure that we will benefit from continued contact and the friendship of Ambassador Kamal in his new functions in New York. I know that I speak on behalf of all of us in wishing Ambassador Kamal and his family every happiness and success for the future. Ambassador Kamal, you have the floor.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Madam President, thank you very much for your kind words.

I am reminded of a true son of Italy a few hundred years ago, one of the most brilliant minds of his age and one of the most important scientists who ever existed, Galileo, who was condemned for believing that it was the Earth which went round the Sun and not the Sun which went round the Earth, and because of that belief he was condemned and sentenced, but just when the judgement was being pronounced he himself came out with a sentence which is historically famous, "e pur si muove" - and yet it moves. Over the six years that I have been here much has moved. I joined the Conference on Disarmament in 1989, and I sat in this very seat when I came to this august body. Over those intervening six years, because of our monthly rotation principle, I shuffled and shifted turn by turn to the next seat on my right, finally made it up on the podium, sat in the Chair that you occupy with so much elegance today, was then shunted down to the other side across the room and all the way around until I have come back where I started. That has been an extraordinary experience in itself, not only because it has enabled me to admire the extraordinary frescoes of this room from all sides and from all angles, but also because it has enabled me to see from totally different perspectives the problems that each one of us has to face in this body. That was a great experience in learning, in self-enrichment, in seeing what are the many things that should be done and the many things that should not be done.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

What are some of those lessons that I have learnt in those six years? Firstly, that there are always two sides at least to any question; that should have been obvious in any negotiating body, certainly one where vital national security interests have to be presented and defended, and certainly also because democracy is the art of compromise between my position and that of my neighbour. But unfortunately, much of the work that has been done in this Conference appears to have been based on the principle that what is mine is mine and what is yours is negotiable.

The second lesson that I have learnt is that we are in a process of deep and profound change; structures have crumbled, firstly because some people believe that they have won World War III, others who no longer know which bloc they are aligned with or party to, and still others who have no idea as to who to be non-aligned with or against. It is, therefore, normal that when standing on shifting sands of this type, our behaviour should become slightly irrational and irresponsible and frustrated. That irrationality and frustration is increasingly visible in this body.

Thirdly, an agenda or a course of action cannot be fixed or frozen in time - an agenda is a living organism, it has to evolve, it is framed at one point of time and in only one particular context. It cannot logically be valid at different periods of time and in different contexts. This is particularly so when we know - and each one of us here can bear witness to that - that the greatest part of the turmoil that we have seen in the past quarter-century has been regional in nature and with the use of conventional armaments. It is not possible to hold back due consideration of these two aspects, certainly not for much longer. The pressure is too great, and we must show a willingness to evolve and to move forward in step with the reality of our experience and time.

Fourthly, while consensus is important, it must have some "give" built into it. A ham-handed defence of national interests has to give way to the logic of what I would call a higher loyalty, namely that of loyalty to an international society in a global village. All of us are guilty here, the weaker to a lesser extent, the stronger to a greater extent. We must move forward in our consideration of how to face the inherent contradictions in the principle of consensus.

Fifthly, this Conference on Disarmament, with a membership of less than 40, cannot be representative of a society of more than 180. Expansion is, therefore, essential. That, unfortunately, cannot be according to the wishes of only some; it has to be the subject of a general and total agreement - a balance of ideas and a balance of colour has to be struck so that this Conference can do the task that is expected of it by international society. It does not matter if there are differences of opinion here; difference of opinion is the essence of democracy. We all learn from the opinions of others, and it is in adjusting to the opinions of others that we do not weaken ourselves individually but we strengthen ourselves collectively.

(Mr. Kamal, President)

Sixthly, we should not be overly afraid of windmills and shadows - many of them are topical, they come and they will pass. One of them looms large over this room today as we move slowly forward towards the deadline of next month. The more we start playing games with our current negotiations as a result, the more the impression grows that we have guilty consciences and skeletons to hide. Many of us may have made mistakes in the past, may not have fulfilled their sides of the bargain, but let us not compound those errors, let us learn from our collective mistakes and move forward, hopefully, into a slightly better world.

Seventhly and finally, the procedures in the CD need to be moved into a greater degree of informality. Perhaps we might try to advance the rule that speeches should be delivered wherever possible without written texts, as I am doing today. That might elevate the quality of the speeches; it might certainly enable us to speak our minds out more freely and understand each other's positions better and, most important of all, to gauge the degree of flexibility that exists in each other's positions. The process, incidentally, has already started: there are more informal plenaries than in the past. It needs to be nurtured even further.

For me personally, it has been six years of contact with the finest brains that one could ever come across. Some of them have sat on the same side of the table, others have been on the other side of the diplomatic divide. In the process of that debate, I myself have been bashed and stomped into the ground, but I have tried, I hope, to give back as good as I got. Much blood has been spilt on the floor of this body in the process, but irrespective of that, deep friendships have been struck, and I hope some respect earned. There may be some here who believe that the world of the CD may be better after I leave; they may be right, they may also be wrong. We do live in a smaller world. The destinies of Geneva and New York are, fortunately or unfortunately, very intimately linked. Much of our work here ultimately goes to New York and that is where I will be waiting and watching. The CD is an institution and membership of this institution is not an event, it is a process. We come and we go but the party and the negotiation goes on; it has been my privilege to have been part of that process and that party. I look forward to remaining in touch with you from the other side of the Atlantic; we shall all meet again, as you know, rather earlier than some might think or hope, but that will be my pleasure; I hope it will be yours too. I leave this body and Geneva in a few days. I take leave of all my friends on the floor, of all my friends on the benches of the observers, whose presence here has been an essential input into the work of the CD. I take leave of my friends in the secretariat, with whom I have sat and worked and perhaps cried at times. I take leave of the interpreters, who sit behind their anonymous glass booths and give us an input without which we would not be able to work at all. Thank you very much. Goodbye.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal, for his statement which certainly is filled with words of

(The President)

wisdom and which has given me a lot of food for thought for the future. I once again wish Ambassador Kamal well in his future work, and all of us certainly look forward to seeing him again in New York.

I feel it is my duty to inform you that consultations are still going on on all pending issues relating to the Presidential statement covering the agenda and organization of the 1995 session, and I hope to be in a position to report some progress in the near future.

The secretariat has, at my request, circulated a timetable of meetings for next week, which was as usual prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It is, of course, tentative and subject to change if necessary. On this basis, may I take it that the timetable is acceptable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on 16 March 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.702
16 March 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 March 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mrs. Hisami Kurokochi (Japan)

GE.95-60920 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 702nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, allow me to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Mr. Jaakko Blomberg. His presence among us today, for the fourth time over the last two years, is yet further evidence of his country's continued commitment to, and interest in, the Conference on Disarmament. I am sure we are all looking forward to hearing the views of his Government on the issues before us. I should now like to invite Mr. Blomberg to take the floor.

Mr. BLOMBERG (Finland): Madam President, thank you for your kind words, and let me first of all welcome you as the President of the Conference as well as the head of the Japanese delegation. We look forward to cooperating with you, and I would also like you to kindly convey our thanks and best regards to your predecessor, Ambassador Tanaka.

The review and extension Conference of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty begins in a month's time. Its results will reflect upon efforts to curb proliferation and advance arms control for decades to come. Its success is vital for our common security. At the Conference, each State party must answer two hard questions. First, which option of the three provided for the extension of the NPT would best serve its national security? Second, what would the consequences be for its security if the NPT were not extended indefinitely? In the Finnish case, the answers are unequivocal. Finland has concluded that it is in her national interest to make the NPT permanent. As a member State of the European Union, Finland is actively engaged in joint European Union action to seek the broadest possible support for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. For Finland as a non-nuclear-weapon State, the ultimate goal remains the elimination of nuclear weapons. A permanent NPT does not sanction permanent possession of nuclear weapons by anyone. This is clearly stated in article VI of the Treaty. But without a permanent NPT, total elimination of nuclear weapons risks becoming a permanent pipedream. The fourth and final session of the Preparatory Committee, chaired by a representative of my country, Ambassador Patokallio, set the stage for a successful review and extension Conference. We should all begin to focus now on a serious review of the operation of the NPT over the past five years as well as on taking the decision on extension that best serves our common security.

Progress in the negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is first of all important for its own sake. But it would also help prepare the ground for a successful NPT review and extension Conference. Finland urges faster progress on both counts. The treaty should be ready by the end of this year. Our position on the scope of the test-ban treaty is dictated by practical considerations. Not everything which may to some degree be relevant to the treaty is verifiable. Extending the scope of the treaty to activities that could not be verified within reason would only erode the credibility of the whole instrument. We welcome the decision by the United States to drop

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

its proposal for a special right to withdraw from the treaty. As with the NPT, Finland supports a treaty that is of indefinite duration. A standard withdrawal clause, narrowly interpreted, is of course acceptable.

Our view continues to be that the treaty provisions on entry into force should be so constructed as to expedite an early entry into force. Once the treaty is open for signature and ratification, individual countries probably will condition their adherence with certain expectations, starting with the expectation that all five nuclear-weapon States join the treaty. This does not, however, necessitate establishing a priori categories of States for entry-into-force purposes. Political, judgements about the degree of universality required at the outset are best left for political declarations.

Finland supports the establishment of a small CTBT organization co-located with IAEA in Vienna. We see a functional relationship between what IAEA already does and what the CTBT organization will be doing. The treaty should provide for the possibility of contractual arrangements between the two organizations as far as cooperation in verification tasks and administrative support are concerned. Such a cooperative arrangement would clearly be cost-effective.

Finland supports an international monitoring system to collect information through four networks: a seismic network consisting of about 50 primary stations and about 100 auxiliary stations, a radionuclide network consisting of about 100 stations, an infrasound network of about 60 stations and a hydroacoustic network. A limited network for noble gas monitoring could also make a useful contribution. As a general principle, Finland believes that the IMS should use existing stations whenever and wherever possible.

Valuable work is being done in the context of the GSETT-3 test. We believe that it would be useful to start to plan tests with other networks as well.

Finland is ready to make available for the IMS one seismic station as well as one radionuclide station. We are prepared to assume the operational and maintenance costs of these stations for IMS use.

For reasons of cost-effectiveness as well as law, we believe that it is not necessary for the CTBT organization to own the stations in IMS use. Rather, the stations owned by individual States parties should be integrated into the IMS on a long-term contractual basis. As regards the financing of new stations or upgrading old ones, international funding should be the exception rather than the rule. Treaty provisions for the sharing of IMS costs should recognize that the stations in question in most cases serve other functions besides test ban monitoring.

It is important to ensure that all States parties have real-time access to all the data collected by the international data centre. However, we are not in favour of limiting the role of the IDC to that of a mailbox. The IDC should do technical analysis and refine the raw data into more readable form,

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

at least for those States parties who cannot perform these functions themselves. Naturally, the drawing of political conclusions from the data should be left to the States parties.

In the final analysis, the credibility of the treaty will depend on effective provisions for on-site inspections. When necessary, an inspection should begin within a day or two of a suspicious event. We believe that sequencing the inspection into different phases and establishing faster procedures for the initial phase would serve this goal. The managed access provisions of the chemical weapons Convention could provide a model for balancing the requirements for an effective inspection and those for the protection of sensitive, unrelated information. In putting together inspection teams the CTBT organization should in the first place draw upon trained experts predesignated by the States parties. Consequently, only a small cadre of permanent inspectors would be required, with the attendant reduction in costs.

The Conference on Disarmament needs to move rapidly toward negotiating a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes. Finland supports the efforts of the Special Coordinator, Ambassador Shannon of Canada, to forge a consensus on a non-specific negotiating mandate on the basis of United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L. There is no good reason why questions relating to existing stockpiles should delay the start of the negotiations any further.

Transparency in armaments is a new important item on the CD's agenda. This Conference should not only be about nuclear issues. It should become more receptive to the insistent calls for conventional arms control. A repetition of last year's discussion would not be worthwhile, however. A more focused discussion of specific items of global import, such as the principles for international arms transfers, would now be in order.

The perennial issue of expansion of the CD's membership is again the subject of intense discussion, as it has been intermittently since the early 1980s. Last fall, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution which sets a baseline of at least 60 countries for the composition of the CD. Resolution 49/77 B should therefore guide the thinking of all of us. It was, after all, adopted by consensus. We find it simply unacceptable that our membership, and that of others, is held hostage to extraneous circumstances. Nor is it credible to argue that expansion is only necessary so that the so-called threshold States can be fully drawn into the test ban negotiations. Neither reasoning does credit to the Conference on Disarmament. Why should mischief, past or present, count for more than merit? Finland has long believed that any country that is willing and able to contribute to the work of the Conference should be accepted as a member on its own merits. We urge the Conference to prove us right in our belief.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Dobrev.

Mr. DOBREV (Bulgaria): Madam President, at the outset I would like to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, which you have done at a challenging time. I am confident that, as a representative of Japan and with your experience in the field of arms control, you will successfully accomplish this important task. May I also express our appreciation and thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Alessandro Vattani of Italy, for his contribution in bringing this year's CD session into a smooth start? I would also like to extend our best wishes to Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Deputy Secretary-General of the CD.

Bulgaria supports the early conclusion of a universal, multilateral and effectively verifiable nuclear-test-ban treaty. We consider the CTBT an effective tool for halting the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is encouraging that broad agreement has emerged to establish an international monitoring system (IMS) composed of a package of four technologies - seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasound monitoring. It is our belief that the synergistic effect of the application of those four technologies, with the priority role of seismic control could increase substantially the cost-effectiveness of the whole system.

The Republic of Bulgaria has already established a temporary national data centre in order to take an effective part in the ongoing GSETT-3 experiment. We concentrate now our efforts on the compilation and storage of gamma data, as well as on the preparation of a beta station at the Vitosha observatory (beta VTS). In our view GSETT-3 will represent a major contribution to the elaboration of a prototype international seismic monitoring system. At Bulgaria's disposal are considerable expertise and equipment that might be used in a future CTBT verification system under suitable international circumstances. We favour a cost-sharing formula which can ensure just and equitable burden-sharing, clearly defining the States hosting IMS facilities and deserving international support.

We should also identify other ways and means of funding the future IMS stations, situated on the territories of the least developed countries, as defined in the United Nations relevant annual list, as well as on the territories of countries whose participation for geographical reasons is important for adequate global coverage.

My delegation holds the view that a future international organization should best promote the objectives and purposes of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The location, structure and experience of other existing intergovernmental organizations should be of great help in this respect. We consider the candidature of Vienna as the one deserving most serious consideration.

We regard the possible spread of weapons of mass destruction as one of the major concerns of the 1990s. Recent developments in different parts of the world made it clear that under the new security environment the dangers

(Mr. Dobrev, Bulgaria)

and the incentives for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have increased rather than decreased. The existing regimes of multilateral treaties such as NPT, BWC and CWC envisage basic restrictive norms in the field. My Government supports any efforts to further strengthen those regimes. We also share the view that the peaceful economic activities of each sovereign State should not be disturbed by any of those regimes.

Bulgaria strictly abides by its obligations as a party to the existing export control regimes. My country is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zanger Committee. The guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group are in our opinion an indispensable part of our national export control legislation, though we are still not members of the MTCR and the Australia Group. Such an approach, we are convinced, strengthens the main objectives of the non-proliferation regime.

Bulgaria believes that the NPT is the cornerstone of the whole non-proliferation regime. We favour the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT and believe that such an outcome would further strengthen global security and stability. Bulgaria has associated itself with the European Union joint action adopted last year on the preparations for the forthcoming NPT Conference, which aims at achieving this objective.

The success of efforts aimed at banning nuclear tests and strengthening security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT will contribute to achieving peace and prosperity. Bulgaria supports the proposals urging all States, especially nuclear-weapon States, to endorse initiatives designed to avoid the use of nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear war, as well as the proposals aimed at preventing the first use of nuclear weapons against each other. Bulgaria attaches particular importance to articles III and IV of the NPT, relating to safeguards and technical cooperation. We are convinced that the NPT review and extension process will interact with developments within IAEA in these two areas.

A world-wide cut off in the production of fissile material for weapons purposes would be another extremely important nuclear arms control measure capable of strengthening the non-proliferation regime. The Conference on Disarmament already undertook work in this field. My delegation would like to express its appreciation of the efforts made by the Friend of the Chair Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada with a view to obtaining consensus on a negotiating mandate for a relevant ad hoc committee. In our view no mandate whatsoever of that committee could prejudge the possible scope of a relevant treaty which is to be further clarified during the negotiations.

My delegation regrets that the CD has so far not succeeded in establishing ad hoc committees on transparency in armaments, negative security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space. We are committed to an early start of these working bodies with the mandates already agreed last year. At the same time the Bulgarian delegation, taking into consideration the difficulties of some CD members, is flexible as to the future mandate of the TIA Ad Hoc Committee. It is our belief in any case that the work done so far in this field should continue, especially with respect to the measures

(Mr. Dobrev, Bulgaria)

relating to conventional arms. The single multilateral negotiating body of disarmament should not lose the momentum in balancing at least to a certain extent the nuclear and conventional CD agenda items. In the agreed working programme of last year's Ad Hoc Committee on TIA, conventional arms were not the only item under consideration. Transfers of high technology with military implications and weapons of mass destruction were also addressed with a view to elaborating practical means to increase openness and transparency, in accordance with existing legal instruments. We believe that the issue of TIA should not be turned back to the stage of informal consultations led by a special coordinator. The TIA Ad Hoc Committee, unlike some other CD working bodies, already started discussions on several concrete aspects of the working papers put forward last year. We are ready to re-establish the work of the TIA Ad Hoc Committee within the existing mandate, though we remain flexible to reconsider the possibility of including both conventional-weapons and weapons-of-mass-destruction aspects.

My delegation is convinced that all non-nuclear-weapons States which have renounced the nuclear option do not deserve to remain vulnerable to the use or threat of use of such weapons. This legitimate right of States could be completely and effectively guaranteed in a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding international instrument based on a common formula. To this end, an adapted new option of resolution 255 of the United Nations Security Council from 1968 would be a good example of a responsible attitude of the nuclear-weapon States on the eve of the NPT review and extension Conference. This resolution could be an appropriate point of departure for negotiating a future treaty.

Finally, let me express our regret that the CD has failed so far to reach a consensus on the issue of expansion of its membership. In our view the enlarged composition of this body will increase its representativeness and effectiveness. At the same time, we do not want to miss this opportunity once again to reiterate our position on the Slovakia case, which we consider a separate one, deserving a positive solution without any further delay.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Madam President, I would like at the outset to express my pleasure at welcoming you to Geneva and to the Conference on Disarmament, where you have recently taken up your responsibilities as Permanent Representative of Japan. It is not every day that a new colleague arrives in the Conference on Disarmament to take up immediately the duties of President, and I therefore wish you every success during your presidency, particularly since a number of unresolved issues will need to be pushed. I wish to assure you of the full support and cooperation of the delegation of Egypt, especially in view of the close relationship between our two countries, as reflected in President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak's visit to your country this week.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

I also take this opportunity to welcome our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Morocco, Myanmar and China, and I wish them every success.

We have listened today to the important statement made by His Excellency Ambassador Blomberg, the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, and, as I welcome him in the name of the delegation of Egypt, I would like to wish him and his friendly country every success. I also avail myself of this opportunity to express our appreciation to him for the positive contributions made by Finland to the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Much has been said over the last three years on the question of transparency in armaments, and on several occasions positions have been attributed to some delegations which have not accurately reflected their views. Thus, we have deemed it necessary to clearly specify our position on transparency in armaments, taking into account the fact that the establishment of the committees on nuclear security assurances and on prevention of an arms race in outer space has unfortunately been suspended pending the resolution of the transparency issue.

I am confident that those of us who attended the deliberations of the First Committee in New York during the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly in 1991 will recall the intensive consultations that took place regarding the text of what became resolution 46/36 L entitled "Transparency in armaments". It is no secret that already at that time there were significant divergences of views on several aspects of the text of that resolution and the way in which that subject should be approached. The delegation of Egypt at that time and on many subsequent occasions advised against the use of vague and unusual terminology which would inevitably result in differing interpretations of the text. To give an example, the phrase "military holdings" is not clearly defined, and in our view it would have been much simpler to use instead a clear term such as "stockpiles", as already proposed by the delegation of Egypt at that time. The same ambiguity applies to the phrase "procurement through national production", which was insisted upon by some delegations in order to avoid using a straightforward and much clearer reference to "national production". To our regret, restrictive factors were also introduced into the resolution when it was drafted where weapons of mass destruction are concerned, in an attempt to restrict any discussion on transparency in this field within the framework of existing legal instruments. To us, such a reference means the exclusion from the discussions of those countries which are not party to any of these existing legal instruments, which is in our view not a constructive or correct approach to adopt. The resolution's numerous shortcomings were then crowned with the establishment of a "United Nations Register" restricted to certain categories of conventional arms, while disregarding other types of conventional arms, as well as weapons of mass destruction, transfers of high technology with military applications, stockpiles and national production during the deliberations of the transparency Committee, even though the resolution is not entitled "Transparency in conventional arms".

Given all these inconsistencies, of which we were well aware and which we tried our best to rectify, Egypt would have been entirely justified in voting

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

against resolution 46/36 L and objecting to any attempt to deal with this issue in the Conference on Disarmament. Nevertheless, we voted in favour of the resolution in order to show our good intentions and the extent to which we are committed to achieving full transparency in all types of arms, in the hope that more consultations on this issue would put the international community on the right track to deal with this subject in a comprehensive manner. We also voted in favour of the said resolution because paragraphs were added to it which requested the Conference on Disarmament to look into this issue and which, to us, offered a good opportunity to try to redress the shortcomings of the resolution itself as well as those of the Register which was established thereunder.

When the subject of TIA came to the Conference on Disarmament in 1992, Egypt continued to play a constructive role in the deliberations on that subject. Although an item entitled "Transparency in armaments" was included in the Conference on Disarmament's agenda, no consensus was reached on the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with this question. I myself had the honour of being entrusted with the function of Special Coordinator on the subject, and the informal open-ended consultations I conducted with the participation and cooperation of all members of the Conference on Disarmament resulted in a compilation of different views on the various aspects of transparency in armaments dealt with in resolution 46/36 L (operative paras. 12 to 14). This was reflected in the report by the Conference on Disarmament for 1992, which was submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session. It was not possible then to reach a consensus on any of the issues, and it was clear that a significant divergence of views existed on all the subjects discussed during that session. During the Conference's session in 1993 I also had the honour of chairing the Ad Hoc Committee on TIA, which was established for the first time that year, and the discussions which took place in the Committee reflected a divergence of viewpoints and positions because it became clear to our national authorities that the Conference on Disarmament was not in a position to achieve what we had hoped to achieve when we adopted that resolution 46/36 L during the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly in 1991. That was due to the selective and restrictive approach adopted by some delegations in dealing with this subject. It also soon became clear that, to some, the objective was not to achieve complete transparency in armaments or to expand and improve the United Nations Register but simply to receive a maximum amount of information on the overall military capabilities of some countries while divulging a minimum of information on one's own.

This year, since the beginning of the Conference's session for 1995, we have repeatedly heard that several non-aligned and other countries are obstructing the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments because they are opposed to transparency in general, and, as a result, do not want to be constrained by any specific commitments in this regard. Such views are totally unrealistic. Recalling a few facts might help to show just how wrong they are. First, Egypt firmly supported the need to include all weapons of mass destruction in the United Nations Register. While we are certain that no country will report its illicit activities to the

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United Nations, it is not unreasonable to expect self-confessed nuclear-weapon States or those which possess nuclear, chemical or biological weapons to announce that fact. Is this transparency? Thus, we find that there is some kind of understanding of what is being requested by some delegations, namely the need to deal with stockpiles within the framework of the mandate which is being negotiated, a mandate for the establishment of a committee concerned with the item on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials which contribute to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or any other nuclear devices.

Secondly, the delegation of Egypt has repeatedly stressed the need to find the best ways and means of reporting on transfers of high technology with military applications. If it is possible to establish selective and restrictive control or monitoring systems - to which we are opposed - for certain activities, then we could surely set up global, balanced and non-discriminatory mechanisms to monitor transfers of high technology with military applications with the aim of exchanging information in a balanced and transparent manner about the military capabilities of each and every country. Would that not be considered as transparency?

Thirdly, Egypt strongly advocates the inclusion of additional types of advanced conventional weapons in the United Nations Register, and fails to understand why some refuse to include in the Register various types of advanced conventional weapons which, when used, could have devastating effects. Why should reporting on conventional weapons be restricted only to those seven categories of conventional arms which are available to smaller armies, while more advanced conventional arms in the possession of larger armies escape all scrutiny? Is that transparency?

Fourthly, the delegation of Egypt has also supported the idea of injecting a degree of transparency into the field of research, development, testing and evaluation. Since it is common knowledge that arms classified under one of these categories can be and have been used in the field, we wonder why no consultations are taking place on measures to report them. Do these measures not come under transparency in armaments?

In the light of the positions already adopted by Egypt vis-à-vis transparency in armaments during the past years within the framework of the CD, in addition to the aspects that I have just referred to, we are far from opposing the application of transparency to all fields of armaments or wanting to block it. The opposite is true. We are opposed only to selectivity. Transparency in armaments is a relatively new item on the Conference on Disarmament's agenda, and we will do our best to ensure that it does not meet the same fate as other dormant items on the Conference on Disarmament's agenda.

Items 2 (Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament) and 3 (Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters) are regrettably, to judge by past experience, little more than formal items. They are re-inserted every year on the agenda of the CD without any progress being achieved in dealing with such items. Moreover, items 4 (Prevention of an arms race in outer space) and 5 (security assurances) are examples of items on

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which, despite the good will of an overwhelming majority of the participants in the Conference on Disarmament, the desired progress has not been achieved. As regards item 7 (Comprehensive programme of disarmament), its fate too is not less bleak for reasons that I became well aware of personally in 1992 when I had the honour of being Special Coordinator on this item. Due to the opposition of certain delegations to this particular item, no positive results could be reached.

At this stage it is indeed useful to remind those present of the fact that conventional weapons are being negotiated upon within various frameworks. For example, I can refer in this connection to the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which was negotiated within the framework of international humanitarian law. In addition to all this, a group of governmental experts concerned with the preparations for the review conference of States parties to the said Convention held many meetings with a view to improving the text of the said Convention. It is only natural, if we are negotiating on a Convention to restrict the use of conventional weapons which have excessively injurious effects, that we should also negotiate on weapons which are more harmful and more destructive, namely nuclear weapons.

These were a number of clarifications my delegation wanted to make at this stage concerning its position on TIA, considering the fact that we have noticed that there is a growing trend among some delegations to the Conference which does not accurately reflect the real positions of all countries as regards the question of transparency in armaments. Before concluding, I would like once again to urge the Conference on Disarmament to proceed rapidly to the designation of a special coordinator on TIA who could try to reconcile the various positions on the subject and determine whether there is a possibility of reaching consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc committee on a sound basis. I would also like to reiterate the request made by a large number of Conference members, including Egypt, advocating the inclusion of a separate item on nuclear disarmament as item 2 of the Conference's agenda, to be dealt with through an ad hoc committee as a high-priority item, particularly as we are approaching the NPT review and extension Conference to be held in April/May 1995 and in view of the desire to achieve the objectives we agreed upon in 1968 on the conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty. I am referring here in particular to article VI, which states:

> "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" - I repeat, "and to nuclear disarmament" - "and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament" - "under strict and effective international control."

Considering the fact that the Conference on Disarmament is the sole international negotiating forum concerned with disarmament questions, it has a basic responsibility to conduct the negotiations needed to achieve the aims

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and objectives of the non-proliferation Treaty, particularly as regards the implementation of the provisions of article VI of this treaty, which I quoted above.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me. This concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Madam President, let me start by congratulating you on the calm and efficient way in which you are conducting our business. I had not put myself down to speak, but having listened to Ambassador Zahran, I thought I should make one or two remarks.

I think it was very helpful for us to have the views of Egypt spelt out once again. There are, of course, no surprises in what Ambassador Zahran said; he is nothing if not consistent. The view of my delegation is quite clear. My Government wishes to see a balance in the Conference's work between nuclear and other items. We have always seen TIA as the one item currently being dealt with by the Conference which permits consideration of conventional issues. It seems to me, quite frankly, that Ambassador Zahran has spelt out very clearly exactly why we need to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee soon, if only to debate the important differences of view to which he refers. I would note in this connection that last year, under the admirable chairmanship of Ambassador Boytha, TIA was the one Ad Hoc Committee which actually made use of all the time allocated to it. I am confident that once it is re-established under Ambassador Hoffmann's leadership, it will do the same this year. Differences of view over the scope of the discussion have not prevented agreement on the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee in the past, and yet they are not new. I regret that they appear to be being allowed to prevent the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee this year.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me. Is there any other delegation who wishes to take the floor? I see none.

As delegations are aware, a number of issues relating to the Presidential statement, covering the agenda and organization of the 1995 session, are still pending. These pending issues are being dealt with in the Presidential consultations as well as in my own bilateral consultations. I certainly appreciate the vigorous efforts made by the member States and groups. I do hope that, as the end of the first part of the session draws near, the remaining obstacles will be overcome through further intensive efforts so that the Conference might address all the items on its agenda in a more determined fashion.

(The President)

The secretariat has, at my request, circulated a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference next week. This was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, is tentative and subject to change if necessary. On this basis, may I take it that the timetable is acceptable?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Thursday, 23 March 1995, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.703
23 March 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 23 March 1995, at 10.35 a.m.

President: Mrs. Hisami Kurokochi (Japan)

GE.95-61012 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 703rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. I apologize for the delay in opening this plenary due to consultations going on for some time.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the United States of America, Sri Lanka, Ireland and Canada. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): Madam President, may I first of all express my appreciation to you for the deft and distinguished manner in which you have conducted your presidency, in spite of the fact that this is your first month as your country's representative to the Conference on Disarmament. Since this is also the first time I have addressed the Conference this session, I take the opportunity formally to welcome you and our other new colleagues who have arrived this year.

In a few short weeks, the States parties to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the NPT, will meet in New York to decide the future of that treaty. This is demonstrably the most significant arms control decision to confront the international community for some time. For its part, the United States Government, from the very top on down, has assigned the highest priority to the indefinite extension of the NPT. As President Clinton noted in a speech he gave on 1 March - a speech which I have asked to be circulated as a CD document - "nothing is more important to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons than extending the treaty indefinitely and unconditionally". Failure to do so, he warned, "could open the door to a world of nuclear trouble". He emphasized that "the NPT is the principal reason why scores of nations do not now possess nuclear weapons; why the doomsayers were wrong".

The United States Senate, in its 16 March "sense-of-the-Senate" resolution in support of indefinite extension of the NPT, was equally unequivocal in saying that "parties opposing indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT are acting against their own interest, the interest of the United States and the interest of all the peoples of the world by placing the nuclear non-proliferation regime and global security at risk".

As we make our preparations for the NPT review and extension Conference, United States officials have spared no effort in building the case for indefinite extension. Of major importance in this regard are the various indications of the successful operation of the treaty in all its aspects, from providing a framework for the safe and peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the stemming of nuclear weapons proliferation. Although there are many concrete examples to be cited across the broad spectrum of the Treaty's provisions, today I would like to focus specifically on the implementation of its article VI.

A large body of evidence demonstrates unequivocally that the United States and Russia have worked both ceaselessly and successfully over the last 25 years to meet their obligations under article VI of the treaty to end the arms race and to seek general nuclear disarmament. The list of achievements is long and impressive. In recent years alone, both countries

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have eliminated over 2,500 nuclear-capable intermediate-range missiles and have taken an entire class of weapon systems out of their inventories; they have decided unilaterally to withdraw and dismantle thousands more tactical nuclear arms; and they have begun under the START Treaties to remove more than 17,000 nuclear weapons from strategic missiles and bombers. These efforts bear evidence to the seriousness with which the United States views its obligations under article VI of the Treaty. The arms race is a thing of the past. Now the race is on to bring down nuclear force levels as quickly, safely, and securely as possible.

Many steps have been taken to do this. At the Washington summit last fall, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to step up the pace of START I's entry into force and, once START II is ratified, to deactivate all strategic nuclear delivery systems that are scheduled to be reduced under the START Treaties. They instructed their experts to look for ways to adapt to the changed international security situation, to include the possibility, after START II ratification, of yet further reductions of strategic nuclear forces. Other steps taken by the Russian Federation and the United States include cooperation to prevent nuclear smuggling and strengthen controls over nuclear materials, and to improve rapidly the safety and transparency as well as to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear weapons reductions.

Since 1988, the United States has reduced its total active nuclear stockpile by 59 per cent, its strategic nuclear warheads by 47 per cent, and its non-strategic nuclear force warheads by a remarkable 90 per cent. The United States is working to dismantle up to 2,000 nuclear warheads a year, the highest rate that our technical limitations will permit. In addition, as announced by President Clinton on 1 March, the United States is permanently withdrawing 200 metric tons of fissile material, both highly enriched uranium and plutonium, from its nuclear stockpile. This figure represents a very significant portion of all the fissile material that was produced for that stockpile.

Together with other members of the international community, the United States has taken enormous strides toward disarmament as evidenced by our collective efforts to control missile technology and conventional arms, and by our common progress toward the complete elimination of biological and chemical weapons. As President Clinton affirmed recently in his joint communique with Indian Prime Minister Rao, we envision, ultimately, a world free of nuclear arms. Making the NPT permanent will be a giant step in the direction of general nuclear disarmament.

The Conference on Disarmament is working hard to achieve another important goal with respect to nuclear arms control and non-proliferation - the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear testing. At the outset of this part of our CD session, Ambassador Ralph Earle, Deputy Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, reiterated the commitment of the United States to achieving a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty at the earliest possible date. He informed the CD of three decisions made by President Clinton: on extending the United States testing moratorium, on asking the CD to remain in session to negotiate a CTBT, and on dropping the

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United States' 10-year special withdrawal provision. These moves were designed both to underscore the United States commitment to negotiations in Geneva and to provide an impetus to those negotiations. More recently, President Clinton, in his 1 March speech, again stressed the importance of an early conclusion to our CTBT negotiations, saying that "to stop the development of new generations of nuclear weapons, we must also quickly complete negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty".

For our part, the United States has been generally satisfied with the pace of some of the work conducted during the current part of the session - by experts and in drafting groups. The United States would have liked, however, to have seen more overall progress achieved at this point, in keeping with the President's injunction to achieve a treaty at the earliest possible time. Nevertheless, we look forward to a revised rolling text that will emerge shortly after the end of this part of the CD session. We expect that the text will be more concise, with the main issues for resolution set out in clearer terms in order to facilitate decision-making during the inter-sessional period in capitals and here in Geneva when the CD session resumes. To expedite progress and demonstrate resolve, it is still my hope that the United States proposal to return to Geneva for inter-sessional work will be supported, if not in May after the NPT review and extension Conference, then in July between parts II and III. The CTBT negotiating path has been bumpy, but the CD has been moving steadily along. Important decisions have been made on key treaty elements, the rolling text has evolved and, in my judgement, progress towards a CTB at this point is well advanced and irreversible.

Turning to yet another facet of the nuclear dimension, security assurances, there is also progress to report. For many years, numerous States parties to the NPT have expressed concern that appropriate measures be undertaken to ensure and safeguard their security. To that end, the United States offered positive security assurances in 1968 and then followed up, in 1978, with so-called negative security assurances - i.e., assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons. On the eve of the NPT review and extension Conference, the United States is reviewing its policies on security assurances, and has sought, in conjunction with its fellow nuclear Powers, to determine what further appropriate measures might be undertaken. The United States continues to believe that it is possible to strengthen and expand the positive assurances offered in United Nations Security Council resolution 255. The United States also sees merit in harmonizing, among the nuclear Powers, the language contained in their negative security assurances. My Government plans to report soon on the outcome of our own internal review and expects positive results emerging from P-5 discussions.

There is another important area related to nuclear arms control and non-proliferation in which my country has been working to achieve progress. In a speech before the United Nations General Assembly in 1993, President Clinton called for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes as a goal that would contribute to the larger objective of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, a cut-off treaty continues to be a very high priority

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of the Clinton Administration. The treaty we seek would be global, non-discriminatory, and effectively verifiable. It would cap the amount of material available for nuclear weapons, and its verification measures would extend international safeguards to new facilities. The United States believes that a cut-off treaty is possible in the relatively short term. My delegation hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will today be able to reach agreement to establish a committee to negotiate a cut-off treaty on the simple basis of the consensus achieved during the 1993 United Nations General Assembly.

Since the first day of this 1995 CD session, the United States has supported the re-establishment of the same four ad hoc committees that the CD had in 1993 and 1994. The United States regrets that this body has not been able to follow the precedent of previous years. We regret even more that a few among us do not really agree with the overwhelming view that the CD must tackle important issues related to conventional disarmament. As a result, this body seems to be sending a message to the world community that it is uninterested in devoting any attention to the conventional field. We seem to be saying that the CD could not care less about the fact that since World War II, hundreds of thousands if not millions of lives have been lost due to conventional weapons, not nuclear weapons, and this regrettable and massive carnage continues today, worldwide, as we sit here in this stately, peaceful chamber. Not only should the CD agree to the prompt establishment, of an ad hoc committee on cut-off of production of fissile material, it should also agree to the rapid re-establishment of the same ad hoc committees it had last year, most importantly the Committee on Transparency in Armaments. It is discouraging, Madam President, that despite your own highly professional best efforts, and those of Ambassador Vattani before you, the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to establish any of the other ad hoc committees that existed last year, with the sole exception of the NTB Ad Hoc Committee. Moreover, we have not been able even to appoint special coordinators for the issues to be handled by these committees, nor even coordinators for the separate issues of membership expansion, the CD's agenda and improved and effective functioning.

On membership expansion, I would like to reaffirm the openness of the United States to any proposal to bring the size of the CD more in line with recent changes in the world community. Last fall, the United States was pleased to join consensus on the United Nations General Assembly resolution on membership expansion which, inter alia, advocated a significant expansion of the CD to at least 60 countries. Further, the United States stands by its proposal of last year that all 23 States identified by Ambassador O'Sullivan in his report to the CD be immediately admitted as members, with the proviso that no members of the CD who now or in the future should be subject to comprehensive enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter would be able to participate in CD decisions by denying consensus. We urge continued consideration of this proposal. We also hope the CD can soon appoint a special coordinator for membership expansion who can find a solution which satisfies the long-standing and well-justified call to expand the Conference's membership.

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I would like to make a quick observation about the Slovak Republic's application to the CD. Like my colleagues in the Western Group and the members of the Eastern Group, the United States supports the quick and speedy acceptance of Slovakia into this CD body. I urge the Conference to find a solution to this question as soon as possible. I also urge my colleagues in the Group of 21 to take a definitive position on this matter. It has been on the table for some time and deserves a timely answer.

In closing, while it is an encouraging fact that the end of the cold war has set the scene for the CD to make major progress across the entire arms control and disarmament spectrum, it is a lamentable fact that a number of this body's members have been palpably unwilling to focus on all those arms control and disarmament issues that really matter in the post-cold-war world. Although we are indeed making useful progress on one important treaty, our true potential is being diminished by procedural paralysis. Collectively we should not tolerate this state of affairs. I and my delegation pledge to do all we can to see that the Conference on Disarmament reaches its full potential.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Goonetilleke.

Mr. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka): Madam President, it is indeed a great honour for me to welcome you and to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. As representative of a country which has traditionally upheld equality between men and women, I am particularly pleased to see you presiding over this Conference.

Permit me to extend my delegation's sincere good wishes to Mr. Vladimir F. Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference, and his deputy Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, for their continuing contributions to the work of the CD. Let me also express my delegation's appreciation of, and thanks to, your distinguished predecessors, Ambassador Vattani and Ambassador Nasseri, for their stewardship of the CD during its critical months. My delegation's special thanks are due to Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann and his "tigers" led by Dr. Peter Marshall, and Ambassador Dembinski for their collective labour of love that brought forth a text of a draft CTBT. And let me congratulate Ambassador Dembinski, Ambassador Lars Norberg and Ambassador Jaap Ramaker who have "inherited" from their distinguished predecessors the CTBT treaty-making process, as chairmen of the NPT Ad Hoc Committee and its two vital working groups. Let me welcome to Geneva and into our fold new colleagues - Ambassador U Aye of Myanmar, Ambassador Bendjelloun-Touimi of the Kingdom of Morocco and Ambassador Sha Zukang of the People's Republic of China - and wish them every success. In so doing, let me not forget, but remember with gratitude, their distinguished predecessors, Ambassador Tin Kyaw Hlaing, Ambassador El Ghali Benhima and Ambassador Hou Zhitong, and, Madam President,

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your own distinguished predecessor Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka, for their outstanding contributions to the Conference on Disarmament, and wish them every success in their new assignments.

It is my intention to limit my statement to two broad but interrelated subjects, namely, nuclear disarmament and security assurances. Of late, the CD has heard statements exhorting the importance of establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. Although this subject has been on our agenda for many years, the CD has not been able to deal with it for a variety of reasons. On the other hand, the Conference had dealt with the subject of negative security assurances (NSA) within the confines of an ad hoc committee for a considerable period of time. Regrettably, the state which the CD is presently in prevents it from dealing with either of these important subjects. However, that predicament should not detract us from discussing these two important subjects.

I am fully aware of the positions taken by various delegations in regard to nuclear disarmament. While some have taken the position that the agenda of the CD is replete with matters relating to nuclear issues, others have expressed the view that conventional weapons are more insidious than nuclear weapons, citing the number of wars fought since World War II using conventional weapons, and the death toll of such wars. Some others go to the extent of comparing land-mines with nuclear weapons with the intention of establishing that in real life the former is more dangerous than the latter. Despite these attempts to conceal the true nature of nuclear weapons, all of us are painfully aware what nuclear weapons, once unleashed, are capable of doing to this planet and to its inhabitants. No threat of such extinction is posed by any one of the conventional weapons. More importantly, the international community has been able to outlaw other weapons of mass destruction such as bacteriological and chemical weapons. The only weapon of mass destruction which still threatens mankind is the nuclear weapon.

The year 1995 is depicted by many as an important milestone in our march towards international peace, security and disarmament. For some it signifies the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II. For others, it signifies the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. For some others, it is important for an entirely different reason, namely, it is the fiftieth anniversary of the first use of atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For the victors, the atomic bomb was a convenient instrument that brought World War II to a speedy end. For the vanquished, however, it was a weapon of mass destruction unprecedented in the history of mankind. For all of us, who recall this horrendous happening 50 years later, it is an inhumane act that should never have been allowed to happen or be repeated.

History apart, the importance of 1995, particularly to those who deal with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, cannot be overemphasized. The historic review and extension Conference of the NPT, which will determine the future of the treaty, will be held in New York in a few weeks' time. Negotiation of a CTBT, which is another pillar of nuclear disarmament, has entered a crucial phase this year. The positive outcome of these two events are quite sufficient to make the year 1995 a memorable one for the entire

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international community. The work we do, and the decisions we take this year, will undoubtedly have an indelible and far-reaching impact on the history of mankind.

The transformation the world has undergone since the height of the cold war is undeniably considerable. The NPT was negotiated when the super-Power rivalry and the suspicion between the East and the West were at their peak. The confrontation between these two blocs very nearly dragged the entire world into an uncertain fate. The situation that existed at that time led to increasing reliance on and the growth of nuclear-weapons stockpiles which eventually threatened our very existence. The conclusion of the INF, START I and START II treaties contributed immensely to change this bleak situation and reverse the nuclear arms race. This situation underwent further changes in the early 1990s to the extent that confrontation between the two rival blocs has been replaced by an unparalleled cooperation. It was as if an unseen hand was guiding humankind away from a certain catastrophe to a new future which is full of hope. As we enter the twenty-first century, we should discard the extant relics of confrontation. The last remaining weapon of mass destruction in the hands of a few countries should not threaten the future generations who will be the inheritors of the Earth. As we move on to the twenty-first century, we must muster courage to discard old doctrines to suit the changing security environment and international relations.

To understand and appreciate the subject that we are discussing, it is necessary for us to briefly survey the topography of the world in so far as it relates to international security. At the time when the NPT was negotiated, there were five declared nuclear-weapon States. Despite our good intentions, the nuclear juggernaut kept on moving steadily growing in size and ferocity and vertical proliferation continued unabatedly. Meanwhile horizontal proliferation, too, when on unchecked. Horizontal proliferation is very likely to continue as long as the declared nuclear-weapon States continue to proffer the doctrine of deterrence and hold on to their unique status. So long as this situation is continued, the non-declared, nuclear-weapon-capable States are likely to continue with their programmes, while other interested States, too, may begin to realize that their national interests and security could be safeguarded only when they, too, possess the nuclear-weapon capability. For most of these States, crossing the threshold means taking the political decision.

Members of the CD have a pretty good idea of the nuclear doctrines followed by the Western and the Soviet blocs during the height of the cold war. NATO, which consists of three of the five declared nuclear-weapon States, was never supportive of a non-first-use principle. Ironically, even now when the security climate in the world has undergone profound changes, these countries continue to cling on to the same old doctrines. Then, it was to deter a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Union on Western Europe. Now, it is entirely for a different purpose, and we shall come to that issue later.

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Times have changed, so has the thinking of the Russian Federation. The former Soviet Union had earlier subscribed to the principle of non-first-use. But now, the Russian Federation maintains that it is not bound by the undertaking given by the former Soviet Union. Moscow now subscribes to the policy of NATO in regard to non-first-use. This leaves only one nuclear-weapon State, namely China, which still supports the principle of non-first-use. China goes a step further and maintains that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those who are States parties to the NPT. Although this offer of unilateral guarantees is a refreshing change from the prevailing situation, it provides little or no reassurance to us, for the other nuclear-weapon States do not subscribe to the Chinese position.

A majority of us expected significant changes in the doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States, when the cold war eventually began to recede. For example, we thought that something positive would emerge when the United States of America decided to conduct a nuclear posture review in October 1993. The outcome of that review, which was released in September 1994, was that the United States of America should continue its nuclear doctrine without a change. This time, however, not to meet a potential threat from its traditional enemy. The decision was that the United States of America should be ready to use nuclear weapons as a last resort in certain circumstances. If the remaining huge arsenal of nuclear weapons is not intended to deter the traditional enemies who are no longer adversaries, the question that invariably arises is against whom these nuclear weapons are meant to be used. In this context of crucial importance, another issue that surfaces is the plan to develop "micro" and "mini" nukes with yields as low as 10-100 tons with the reported intention of targeting third world countries or for battleground use in regional wars. In view of the fact that of the 175 States parties to the NPT, 170 belong to the "have-nots" club, the new development certainly does not inspire confidence in those countries.

On the subject of elimination of nuclear weapons we are heartened to note that two leading nuclear-weapon States, namely the United States of America and the Russian Federation, had some time ago expressed favourable views on the issue. However, the views expressed by the two Presidents have not been followed up. Consequently, no firm policy statements have emanated from these two nuclear-weapon States that they indeed are serious in seeing the world devoid of nuclear weapons. My delegation would, therefore, welcome a firm policy statement from these two nuclear-weapon States in regard to this crucial subject. Instead of firm commitment on the part of nuclear-weapon States, what we have witnessed is the continuation of old practices and doctrines. Meanwhile, work on the development of exotic nuclear weapons continues. It seems to us that the position of the nuclear Powers is that nuclear weapons are good for us, but bad for others. Nuclear weapons are essential for our national security but others should not dare acquire them for that or any other purpose. The world which is already polarized into nuclear "haves" and "have-nots" is divided once again into responsible States that could own and possess nuclear weapons, and others that cannot be trusted with such weapons.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

It is against this background we have to look at the important question of security assurances. This certainly is not a new subject. For example, when the NPT was on the drafting board, a set of rights and obligations was envisaged for the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. While the latter acknowledged the right of the former to possess nuclear weapons, they were also required to accept certain responsibilities such as those contained in articles IV and VI of the treaty. While the non-nuclear-weapon States acquiesced in the situation which allowed the permanent Five to possess nuclear weapons, there was a stipulation that the former will be provided with access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Besides this quid pro quo, the permanent Five were required to give positive security assurances which we find in Security Council resolution 255 (1968). However, the weakness inherent in that resolution, particularly in its operative paragraph 2, compelled the non-nuclear-weapon States to demand firm negative security assurances. In the recent past, non-nuclear-weapon States have made it clear that nothing less than a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding international instrument based on a common formula would eventually satisfy their security concerns.

Thus, we now find ourselves in a predicament which has no parallel. One hundred and seventy non-nuclear-weapon States have become parties to the NPT on the understanding that they, along with the five nuclear-weapon States, are on a journey that will culminate with nuclear disarmament and eventual elimination of this last category of weapon of mass destruction from the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States. Twenty-five years later, however, we realize that one side has done precious little to keep its side of treaty obligations. Yet we are told by the nuclear-weapon States that the treaty must extend unconditionally and indefinitely. Legal arguments are put forward to convince the States parties that indefinite extension is the only viable option available. Meanwhile, attempts are being made to decided first on the extension issue, and after that, engage in the exercise of reviewing the treaty. To make matters worse, some nuclear-weapon States are trying to get the treaty extended by a simple majority, which is legally feasible, but morally questionable. While all these developments are taking place, nothing worth mentioning has been said by the nuclear-weapon States of their obligations, particularly in keeping with those in articles IV and VI of the treaty.

Both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States are fully aware of the importance of the NPT. They share the view that the longevity of the treaty is essential for international peace and security. Therefore, the logical thing to do is to extend the treaty in keeping with the wish of the States parties to the treaty. While this being the case, the lack of interest on the part of nuclear-weapon States on other aspects of the treaty makes the non-nuclear-weapon States believe that the former are only keen on extending the treaty without fulfilling their obligations. Hence the reference to article VI of the treaty by these countries.

We agree that security assurances are not an integral part of the NPT. However, one must agree that there is an interrelationship between the treaty and security assurances. That was how Security Council resolution 255 (1968)

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came into existence. If 1968 was a good year to grant security assurances, 1995 becomes an equally important year to provide additional security assurances beyond what is contained in Security Council resolution 255 (1968).

In this chamber, we often hear the positions of some nuclear-weapon States on the issue of security assurances. These positions in simple language would amount to saying: "We have given you security assurances. They are contained in Security Council resolution 255 (1968). This being the case, why do the non-nuclear-weapon States need any further assurances?" If the positive assurances given 25 years ago did go far enough to meet our concerns, then there is no reason for the non-nuclear-weapon States to repeatedly renew their demand. This is why Sri Lanka, along with a host of other non-aligned countries, insisted that the CD should continue its work on negative security assurances. It must be made clear that the security assurances given by some nuclear-weapon States to Ukraine and to those who are parties to the Tlatelolco Treaty have not gone unnoticed. The nuclear-weapon States should, and must, not be selective in granting security assurances.

Besides China's consistent and principled position on non-first-use and negative security assurances, which reassures us all, we are also heartened by the positive attitude taken by the Russian Federation, contained in their statement of 23 February concerning both positive and negative security assurances. The willingness of the Russian Federation to improve on Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and to undertake drawing up of an international convention on negative security assurances is indeed laudable. In this crucial year, we naturally look forward to similar commitments by other nuclear-weapon States.

Although the CD is placed in an unique position to realize our objective, the results we have so far achieved in this regard leave much to be desired. The most we have achieved in the CD remains confined to pious reiterations of the scope and nature of the assurances given in 1968. Apart from these oft repeated positions, the CD was unable to make any appreciable progress on negative security assurances in 1994. The current impasse in the CD is such that, despite the fact we have almost completed the first part of the 1995 session, we have not even been able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on NSA this year. Our attitude towards security assurances should undergo a fundamental change, may I say, a complete change of heart. We should take immediate steps to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on NSA and commence our work without any further delay.

In this context, we attach importance to document CD/1277 submitted by some members of the Group of 21, including my own, last year on NSA. That document detailed the view of the non-aligned countries that form the bulk of States parties to the NPT. Those countries have urged the CD to negotiate, as a matter of priority, an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and to undertake negotiations for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. Consequently, the authors of CD/1277 clearly stated that the only completely effective security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

weapons lie in the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it recognized the fact that the very existence of nuclear weapons is in itself a threat to international security and a factor that encouraged proliferation. Those nuclear-weapon States that support "counter-proliferation" measures ought to bear this in their minds.

Annexed to CD/1277 was a draft "Protocol on security assurances". In this regard, I wish to say that we are not inextricably committed to a protocol that should be attached to the treaty. It could take any form so long as it addresses our basic concerns, substantively and definitively. Such an international instrument may take some time to be completed. While that is under consideration, certainly the Security Council could seriously address the question of expanding the scope of its resolution 255 (1968), as has been suggested by the delegation of the Russian Federation. Let us all face the challenges fairly and squarely in the coming months. In this regard my delegation is pleased to hear the statement made by Ambassador Ledogar this morning in which he detailed the work his delegation proposes to undertake in respect of both negative and positive security assurances. It is the hope of my delegation that such work would produce results that will take care of the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ireland, Ambassador Swift.

Mr. SWIFT (Ireland): Madam President, let me begin by congratulating you on taking the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in recent weeks. We have seen the work of the Conference advance under your presidency and we are confident that this progress will continue in the time remaining to you. Let me also pay my respects to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Petrovsky, to his deputy, Mr. Bensmail, and to all their staff, whose work and dedication we appreciate daily.

We are fast approaching the beginning of the 1995 review and extension Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty. This is a twofold event: the Conference will review the Treaty and take a decision on its extension. We attach great importance to both of these aspects.

The NPT may not be a perfect treaty: in many ways it reflects the particular atmosphere of the late 1960s. Yet, in our view, it has served the international community well. When Ireland, along with other countries, promoted the non-proliferation idea in the 1950s and 1960s, our aim was to prevent the spread of a class of weapons of horrific destructive power and to obtain a clear recognition of the value of nuclear disarmament. The Treaty also addressed other important aspects of the nuclear issue such as an acknowledgement of the right of all States to the peaceful use of nuclear technology and the outline of a safeguards system to help ensure the Treaty's implementation.

(Mr. Swift, Ireland)

The Treaty now has more than 170 adherents, including over the last few years the two remaining nuclear Powers, a former nuclear-weapon State and some former so-called threshold States. It would be an extraordinary aberration of history if all of us who adhere to the Treaty, with our wide variety of backgrounds from all parts of the world, were mistaken in our assessment of its value.

Yet over the years some aspects of the Treaty have given rise to criticism. It is sometimes regarded as discriminatory in its distinction between the nuclear and non-nuclear States; others, however, see this distinction as simply a historical fact having consequences for the obligations imposed by the Treaty. It is often said that it was unable to prevent increases in the number and types of nuclear weapons; however, international developments in recent times have helped to ease this legitimate concern, particularly with the agreements between the United States and Russia; and it is worth bearing in mind that the commitment to nuclear disarmament in article VI is the only legal obligation of its kind, providing a basis for advancing down this road, however slowly. The Treaty is regarded by some as not having done enough to help promote peaceful use of nuclear technology: yet the grounds for cooperation exist in article IV and perhaps the issue is rather how to implement this article satisfactorily. The safeguards system is sometimes seen as inadequate; yet it has been a major factor in dealing with possible violators.

All of these, and other, concerns, have a place in the review of the Treaty and we look forward to a full and open discussion of them. But the review is only one part of the forthcoming Conference. The parties to the Treaty must also decide, 25 years after its entry into force, whether to extend the Treaty indefinitely, as provided for in article X.2. As we already stated at the 1990 review Conference, Ireland believes that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely and unconditionally. We have taken this position because we are convinced that, despite any shortcomings, the value of the NPT for non-proliferation is too important to be called into question. In fact we should perhaps consider for a moment the result of any doubt concerning the continuation of the Treaty. Were such doubts to exist or to arise at certain intervals, it might happen, indeed, it would be almost inevitable, that countries, which might feel vulnerable without the Treaty, could begin to take steps to prepare for the possibility of its non-extension. The unavoidable effect of such steps would be to provoke other countries, who might feel threatened, to do likewise, thus provoking a spiral of moves that could be difficult, if not impossible, to contain. If the extension issue were to be on the agenda continually, it is our view that the delicate structure of the Treaty could not continue to bear such pressure for long.

Ireland's European Union partners are also committed to the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. All of us, even with differing approaches to nuclear weapons issues, believe that the Treaty is too valuable a part of the international non-proliferation regime to be put into doubt. Since last summer, we have made this view the subject of a joint action in the preparation of the NPT review and extension Conference and we shall continue to foster this conviction in the time remaining.

(Mr. Swift, Ireland)

Despite differing perceptions of the comprehensive test-ban treaty, there has been steady progress in the negotiations over the past year, with a notable quickening of the pace since the beginning of the 1995 CD session. The Treaty is the main issue occupying the Conference at the moment and the opportunity to push ahead rapidly is clearly being seized. All members of the Conference know that Ireland has advocated such a treaty for a long number of years and we have been heartened by the committed work that is now taking place in the Conference. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Dembinski, and the two chairmen of the working groups, Ambassadors Norberg and Ramaker, have demonstrated clearly their determination to advance the negotiations speedily and in a thorough manner. We would wish to congratulate them - and indeed all members of the Conference - on the spirit in which the negotiations are proceeding.

Ireland would expect a comprehensive test-ban treaty to be exactly that: an international instrument which would comprehensively ban all nuclear explosions for all times. I do not propose to comment on the details of the negotiations today and should simply like to recall that resolution 49/70 at last year's General Assembly urged the participants at the Conference not just to negotiation but "to conclude" a CTBT: we confidently expect that this sentiment will continue to inspire this work of the Conference.

Negotiations on the cut-off of production of fissile material for weapons purposes have still not properly begun. Resolution 48/75 L clearly lays the ground for such work in calling for negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty, banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, and other nuclear devices, in the most appropriate forum. The Conference took up this call in January 1994 in agreeing to appoint a Special Coordinator, Ambassador Shannon of Canada, to consult on how to get the negotiations going. We have watched over the past year as these efforts have come near to achieving an agreement. Yet, one year later, the final step to consensus still apparently needs to be taken.

The question of whether and how to deal with stockpiles remains a major obstacle. Ireland shares the serious and legitimate concerns of the international community about stockpiles of these materials. We see little advantage, however, in preventing the start of a process which will inevitably, in time, open up for discussion the range of factors surrounding this issue. We can only admire the persistence and dedication with which Ambassador Shannon has pursued, and continues to pursue, his task and the interest which his country has taken in advancing this issue. We hope that his efforts will meet with success in the very near future.

While CTBT and cut-off are important issues for progress in disarmament, we consider that the Conference cannot continue to devote itself exclusively to nuclear issues. It is a fact that the wars of the past 50 years have been fought mainly with conventional weapons and the loss of lives in these wars is generally due to conventional weapons. There have been huge and destabilizing build-ups of arms in various parts of the world, often at the expense of economic and social development.

(Mr. Swift, Ireland)

While the legitimate security needs of any State must be covered, we feel that it is high time to try to develop some principles, of a voluntary and political nature, on how restraint and responsibility can be exercised in the acquisition and supply of conventional arms. This is the basic notion underlying the Irish proposal for a code of conduct on conventional arms transfers. The idea is not ours alone and the Conference already has a proposal along similar lines from Romania since last year's session. Indeed, as last year's discussion in the Conference showed, a number of countries are sympathetic to the idea of developing a code, or some principles, which would be applied to conventional arms transfers.

Over the past year we have worked with our European Union partners to try to advance this idea and together, along with some other countries, we presented a procedural proposal to last year's General Assembly. Despite the hesitations about the draft resolution, we believe that work on this topic should continue. We are confident that ways can be found to carry it forward.

The question of expansion of the membership of the Conference has been given added impetus and urgency by the consensus resolution 49/77 B at last year's General Assembly. That resolution recognized the legitimate aspirations of candidate countries to participate fully in the work of the Conference, recalled that a dynamic solution to the question of membership had been recommended in August 1993 and urged the Conference to bring about a significant expansion in its composition to at least 60 countries. We deeply regret that no action has yet been taken in the direction of this resolution. Despite the helpful efforts of the President of the Conference in January and February - and we understand that those efforts are continuing - there is no concrete indication that the Conference as a whole is moving towards an expansion of its membership.

I should perhaps make clear straight away that we see the question of the admission of Slovakia quite differently. In our view, Slovakia was the agreed State to take over the former Czechoslovak seat and it is difficult for us to understand why this case has been linked to the overall expansion issue. We hope that the Conference will re-examine the case again soon in a way which will permit Slovakia to sit at the table as a full member.

Ireland first requested membership of the Conference as far back as 1982 and we have reaffirmed that request consistently and at periodic intervals since then. The basis of our request was our wish to participate fully in the negotiation of international disarmament instruments to which we would subsequently be expected to adhere. That conviction has been strengthened as the pace of different negotiations has intensified and as the instruments in question have financial implications. It seems to us to be at least open to debate whether a particular group of countries should be established permanently in a position where they negotiate international disarmament instruments for the world community as a whole.

This issue could be solved overnight by the Conference agreeing to admit all candidates which request membership and we see a particular advantage in this solution: it would dispense with any selective process. One objection

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to this solution which is often voiced is that there has to be a so-called "balance of views" in the Conference. We wonder about the validity of this line of argument, however, in a situation where the Conference operates by consensus. As the Conference knows only too well, in a consensus situation, it is open to any one member, of whatever view, to insist on their individual position being taken into account. The question of balance of views does not seem to be a significant factor in these circumstances. The real issue, it seems to us, is the need to accommodate countries who wish, and perhaps see it as their right, to participate fully in the negotiation of international disarmament instruments having worldwide applicability.

In conclusion Madam President, may I offer you our continuing good wishes for the rest of your term as President of the Conference and assure you and all the members that we are ever ready to cooperate with you in whatever way we can?

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Ireland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon, who will present a report on the consultations he was mandated to undertake on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Madam President, may I first offer you my congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference, and for your firm but positive management of it?

Last Friday I circulated a report which I am about to read to all member delegations of the Conference on Disarmament with a view to seeking consensus support for it. The report is on the outcome of my consultations on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. I would ask that you put this report to the plenary and seek the concurrence of delegations to the mandate contained in it. I would also ask that the report be made an official document of the Conference. The report reads as follows.

I take the floor to report to you on the progress of my consultations on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

At the beginning of last year's session, I was tasked with seeking the views of members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

As you know, I held numerous consultations, both bilaterally and with groups and reported formally to this plenary on five occasions in 1994. Midway through the last session, consensus was reached that the CD was the appropriate forum to negotiate a treaty on this issue. At the end of the

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

session in September, while there was no agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee, there was agreement, in principle, that an ad hoc committee be established on this issue as soon as a mandate had been agreed. At that time, the CD asked me to continue consultations on an appropriate mandate for an ad hoc committee in order to enable the convening of this ad hoc committee as soon as possible.

At the beginning of this year's session, the Conference decided to continue consultations on a mandate. I have since held numerous consultations, and am pleased to report that delegations have agreed that the mandate for such a committee should be based on resolution 48/75 L of the United Nations General Assembly, and reads as follows:

1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee on a "ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

2. The Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

3. The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1995 session.

During the course of my consultations, many delegations expressed concerns about a variety of issues relating to fissile material, including the appropriate scope of the convention. Some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the committee only of the future production of fissile material. Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit consideration not only of future but also of past production. Still others were of the view that consideration should not only relate to production of fissile material (past or future) but also to other issues, such as the management of such material.

It has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the Ad Hoc Committee any of the above-noted issues. Delegations with strong views were able to join consensus so we could all move forward on this issue. This means that an ad hoc committee on cut-off can be established and negotiations can begin on this important topic. This has for some time been the common objective of all delegations of this Conference.

I have appreciated the productive contribution and support of all delegations in arriving at this result.

This was the report that I circulated last week and that I now seek consensus on. I hope it meets with the concurrence of all delegations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Shannon for the presentation of his report. I am sure that I speak on behalf of all of us when I express our deep gratitude to Ambassador Shannon for his unrelenting efforts in seeking agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc committee on "cut-off".

May I take it, then, that the Conference can adopt the report we have just received from Ambassador Shannon, the Special Coordinator on the issue of a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices? I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I understand that now the distinguished representative of India, Ambassador Chandra, wishes to take the floor.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): Madam President, since this is the first time I take the floor under your presidency, I would, at the outset, like to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency. I pledge the support of my delegation for success in all your endeavours. I would also like to avail of this opportunity to thank your predecessor Ambassador Vattani of Italy who carried out his duties in an exemplary manner.

We have listened very carefully to the report of Ambassador Shannon on the issue of "Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices", also known as the "cut-off" convention. Our deep and abiding commitment to "cut-off" is well known. It is exemplified by the fact that we have since 1982 been tabling a resolution on it in one form or another at the United Nations General Assembly, that former Prime Minister Rajov Gandhi included "cut-off" like the CTBT in the very first stage of his action plan on a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order which was unveiled at SSOD-III in 1988, and that in 1993 we were the proud co-sponsors along with Canada and other countries of the first ever United Nations General Assembly consensus resolution on the subject viz. resolution 48/75 L. The flexibility of the international community together with its desire for forward movement was responsible for the achievement of this landmark consensus resolution. In recognition of the importance of this resolution and the consensus embodied in it, India withdrew its resolution on nuclear arms freeze in 1993 and did not table it in 1994.

In this context, it is only natural that we welcome the setting up of an ad hoc committee on "cut-off" on the basis of a mandate which had been negotiated by consensus as detailed in the three points in italics in Ambassador Shannon's report. The mandate as spelt out therein is squarely on the basis of the 1993 United Nations General Assembly consensus resolution 48/75 L providing for a ban on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and the reportage of the Ad Hoc Committee to the CD on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1995 session. The mandate is no more and no less than this.

(Mr. Chandra, India)

In conclusion, I would be remiss if I did not thank Ambassador Shannon for the hard work put in by him in developing his report. As a co-sponsor of the resolution on "cut-off" I have some idea of the immense complexity of his task. He has handled it most commendably with his customary energy, verve and enthusiasm.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of India for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now recognize the distinguished representative of Algeria, Ambassador Meghlaoui.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria) (translated from French): Madam President, as I am taking the floor for the first time since your arrival, allow me first of all to welcome you and congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Allow me also to extend a welcome to our other new colleagues.

I would like to congratulate Ambassador Shannon on the laudable efforts he has made to arrive at the result he has just set out for us. In this connection I would like to remind you of the statements made by the Algerian delegation on the question of fissile material produced for military purposes, and particularly the statement made at the last meeting of the previous session of the Conference on Disarmament. Algeria's position was reaffirmed before this assembly by the Algerian Minister for Foreign Affairs on Thursday, 9 February 1995. The Algerian delegation attaches great importance to the question of fissile material produced for military purposes, in so far as it encompasses the dimensions of non-proliferation and disarmament. Our delegation joins the consensus, but would like to express its keen desire to see its concern regarding existing stockpiles - concern shared by many other delegations - taken into account in the negotiations on which the new committee will soon embark. The Algerian delegation will not fail to follow these negotiations closely and will take a stand, next year, on the content of the mandate of this committee in light of its assessment of the results to be achieved in that context.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Algeria for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Pakistan, who has asked for the floor.

Mr. BABAR (Pakistan): I have also asked for the floor today to express my delegation's views on the report presented just now by Ambassador Shannon on his consultations to find a consensus mandate for the ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

At the outset, let me extend the deep appreciation of my delegation for the manner in which Ambassador Shannon has conducted his negotiations in order to reach a consensus on this important issue. In a spirit of compromise and cooperation, Pakistan has decided to go along with the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee as proposed by Ambassador Shannon taking into account the attendant understandings and agreements. Pakistan particularly notes the agreement reflected in Ambassador Shannon's report that the mandate for the

(Mr. Babar, Pakistan)

establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising the issue of appropriate scope of the treaty during the negotiating process. The Government of Pakistan has consistently underscored the importance of addressing issues related to fissile material in a comprehensive manner and in accordance with the long-standing international consensus on this issue. Only then would our disarmament concerns be genuinely addressed.

Pakistan strongly believes that the other items on the agenda of the CD warrant equally expeditious disposal. We are seriously concerned over the delay in the establishment of other ad hoc committees, particularly on negative security assurances. This, in our view, is an issue of vital importance for non-nuclear-weapon States and its early finalization will constitute a major confidence-building measure. This committee, as well as other ad hoc committees, should be established without further delay. We look forward to effectively and comprehensively addressing all items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament during the course of this year.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I now recognize the distinguished representative of Switzerland, Ambassador Moser.

Mr. MOSER (Switzerland) (translated from French): Allow me first of all to congratulate you most warmly, Madam President, on the period of your presidency. You have guided the Conference with talent and skill. The Swiss delegation would like to thank you above all for your tireless efforts to uphold the cause of non-member participating States.

Switzerland has become the 27th State party to the 1993 Convention on chemical weapons. The Federal Council has submitted the instruments of ratification to the United Nations Secretary-General. By ratifying the Convention, Switzerland stresses its commitment to binding rules of public international law in the area of arms control, in keeping with the aim of maintaining and promoting security and peace described among the five foreign policy objectives in the report of the Federal Council on Swiss foreign policy in the 1990s. For Switzerland the Convention on chemical weapons, along with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is the most important multilateral disarmament treaty from the standpoint of security policy. The Treaty enjoys the full support of the Swiss chemical industry. Switzerland takes this opportunity to congratulate the Conference on Disarmament on the drawing up of this Convention, which is the first complete disarmament treaty accompanied by a verification regime prohibiting an entire category of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. WICKREMASINGHE (Sri Lanka): My delegation asked for the floor in order to place before the Conference its views on the proposed draft mandate for an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. Allow me to extend my delegation's thanks to Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, who has emerged with a draft mandate following protracted consultations with some delegations and regional groups.

(Mr. Wickremasinghe, Sri Lanka)

Sri Lanka can agree to the draft mandate on the understanding that any delegation could raise for consideration in the future Ad Hoc Committee any of the issues referred to in paragraph 5 of Ambassador Shannon's report (CD/1299). Let me add in elaboration that so far as Sri Lanka is concerned, my delegation agrees to the draft mandate on the understanding that consideration should not only relate to production of fissile material, both past and future, but also to other related issues such as management of such material. In this regard, my delegation takes special note of paragraph 6 of Ambassador Shannon's progress report presented to the Conference today, which reads: "It has been agreed by delegations that the mandate for the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for consideration in the Ad Hoc Committee any of the above-noted issues."

May I also invite the attention of the Conference on Disarmament to the need to re-establish as soon as possible, during the CD's current session, other ad hoc committees, particularly that on negative security assurances, to which my delegation attaches the highest importance? We should dispense with making choices at random.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka for his statement. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

Now that Ambassador Shannon's report is adopted, may I take it that the Ad Hoc Committee on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices is thereby established? I see no objection. I take it that the Ad Hoc Committee is thereby established. The remaining business is the appointment of its Chairman, and unless there are any proposals from the floor, perhaps further consultations will be needed. I see no one wishing to take the floor at this stage, so I think we are very happy to recognize that now the Ad Hoc Committee on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices is established, and further consultations will be conducted in order to appoint the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The secretariat has, at my request, circulated a timetable of meetings for next week. It was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. On this basis, may I assume that the tentative timetable is acceptable to delegations?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As this is the last plenary meeting over which I shall preside, allow me to make a few closing remarks.

When I assumed the presidency of the Conference four weeks ago, I said that I hoped to be able to say that I had had a good and productive four weeks when I handed over the presidency to Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya. It has been indeed a great honour and privilege for me to preside over this august

(The President)

body. Serious negotiations are under way on a CTBT, as the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, its working groups and their subsidiary groups meet literally every day, allowing us no time to stay idle. With respect to other issues, we have continued serious consultations. Ambassador Shannon's report which we heard today is but one example of how seriously consultations have been conducted here in the CD and have borne fruit.

While I regret to pass many issues still unresolved to Ambassador Nanjira, I hope that the tireless efforts we have made so far will bear fruit under the Kenyan presidency. I am ready to cooperate with the new President in my capacity as the representative of Japan as well as his predecessor.

Now I should like to take this opportunity to extend my thanks and appreciation to the Coordinators of the Groups and China for the kind support and cooperation shown to me during my term of office, as well as to all other delegations. I should, of course, like to thank the secretariat for their valuable assistance, and the interpreters for facilitating our work. Allow me to wish once again the incoming President, Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya, every success and assure him that I shall be at his disposal should he require any assistance.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on 30 March 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.704
30 March 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 30 March 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. D.D.C. Don Nanjira (Kenya)

GE.95-61064 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 704th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I should like to convey a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference and my own behalf, to Ambassador Munir Akram, who, as the new representative of Pakistan, is with us for the first time today. Ambassador Akram is no stranger to arms control and disarmament. Throughout his diplomatic career, he has been involved in the multilateral disarmament issues on our agenda and was an active participant in the work of this Conference at its inception. I wish to assure him of our full cooperation.

With your indulgence, I should also like to make some opening remarks as I begin my term as President of the Conference.

I have the honour and duty to convey to you the warmest greetings and best wishes of the Government and people of Kenya. His Excellency President Daniel T. Arap Moi and his Government attach great importance to the work of this Conference and take very seriously the CD's presidency which Kenya occupies from today and will hold in the coming months, including in particular during the period of the NPT review and extension Conference planned in New York for 17 April through 12 May 1995. My Government very much hopes that our efforts will be fruitful and meritorious, and that we shall make valuable contributions to the success of the NPT Conference.

My predecessor, Her Excellency Madam Kurokochi, has done a superb job. The competent manner with which she has directed the work of the Conference has been amazing. She arrived in Geneva probably on a weekend, and the following week, she assumed the presidency of CD. I can only admire such expertise so reminiscent of the alacrity of Japanese culture, and thank Ambassador Kurokochi for what she has done. If Caesar were among us today, he would, with admiration, have proclaimed "venit, vidit et sumpsit" - she came, she saw and she took charge.

Let me also thank His Excellency Ambassador Vattani of Italy for having started the work of the CD so well during this year and for the leadership that he provided us, especially during the difficult consultations which he conducted at the beginning of this session of the Conference.

(continued in Italian)

I know your country well, having been Ambassador to Italy for five years. The country gave birth to Cicerone, Marcus Aurelius and Caesar. I could not have more wonderful memories of any other country in the world.

(continued in English)

Yes, Ambassador, I have wonderful memories of Italy.

Obviously, the distinguished Ambassadors of Brazil, China, Morocco and Myanmar have also been with us for a relatively short period of time and I look forward to working closely with them and with all of you, Excellencies

(The President)

and distinguished delegates. For, though I may be the captain of the ship, all of us have our respective roles to play; all of us are on the same stage, with our respective entrances and exits. I am particularly thankful to the interpreters who facilitate our understanding of each other, and of one another. I recognize the presence of the observers and thank them for being here to participate in the great undertaking we are engaged in, for the cause of humanity. I wish to pay a special tribute to Reverend Father Peter Henry, the distinguished observer for the Holy See, who never misses to attend the plenary meetings of the Conference. Father Henry knows my country very well and has made valuable contributions to it through missionary work. Thanks also to Mr. V. Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the Conference and special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and to Mr. A. Bensmail and their secretariat, for the invaluable services they render to this Conference.

1995 is indeed a memorable year, for a variety of events, some fruitful and others destructive, have been shaping the year since 1 January, and it is evident that many other nasty and pleasant events will continue to shape our planet throughout 1995. This year marks the golden jubilee of the founding of the United Nations, and important activities have been planned to celebrate the occasion. Some of the international conferences and meetings held so far, or planned for later in the year, are quite historic in nature and substance, and they include the NPT review and extension Conference which is to be held on the threshold of the twenty-first century, and will go down in the history of the CD as having been one of the most important disarmament conferences of this decade, also partly because it will be the first major world disarmament conference to be held in the post-cold-war era of the new world order, expected to be safer and freer of nuclear arsenals than the cold war period had been.

This new era, however, though devoid of East-West confrontation, is nonetheless, and paradoxically, fraught with local wars, clashes and all kinds of other conflicts in some of the world's hot spots. These territorial conflicts and clashes have adverse effects beyond their borders, and sooner or later result in destabilizing and negative consequences on international peace, stability and security. As one of the beloved Presidents of the United States may be paraphrased, perpetual fear of all these occurrences may turn out to be our gravest tormentor. For, judging from the prevailing problems and conflicts, the local confrontations and wars that are so common in the world's trouble spots seem to open up more avenues for easier access to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction than they did in the cold war period.

The greatest danger, then, that we face today is that easy access to and lucrative trade in nuclear weapons, fissile materials and other weapons of mass destruction could, if allowed to prosper, lead to a more rapid spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism after the disappearance of the West-East confrontation. Such a trend could, if left unchecked, in turn lead to explosive global consequences, and gravely menace world peace and security.

(The President)

This paradoxical situation of the post-cold-war era could also result in graver local, regional and even global destabilization in the infant new world order.

It is essential, therefore, that we bear these ironies in mind as we prepare for the NPT review Conference. We, the individual representatives of the 37 Governments and States members of the CD, bear the primary responsibility of determining the future cause of general and complete disarmament. This Conference is charged with the high responsibility of negotiating and attaining nuclear and other forms of disarmament. We thus cannot afford to fail in this crucial undertaking, especially now that we have started on a countdown on the twenty-first century, and the NPT review and extension Conference is to occur in exactly three weeks' time. One hopes that we can prepare the world community to enter the next century free of nuclear proliferation. As interested partners mandated to negotiate nuclear disarmament for the survival of humankind and prevention of annihilation of the human race from the face of the Earth, we all recognize the value of the NPT as the global cornerstone for nuclear non-proliferation, and the main international instrument for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.

The challenges facing the international community in the field of nuclear disarmament are thus many and varied, and known to all of us. Nevertheless and based on the foregoing remarks, I would regard the following observations and conclusions as being logical and pertinent at this point in time of my statement.

First, any possession of nuclear weapons nowadays is prompted by a far broader scope of reasons than mere military, security, political or even strategic reasons. Aspects of morality, law, prestige and economics have assumed greater significance than in the past. And what would be better, in this connection, and in the post-cold-war era, than creating, for example, a clear and lasting interconnection between disarmament and development?

Second, for the non-proliferation regime to be lasting and comprehensive on a global scale, it must be effected by measures calling for the enactment of non-proliferation laws, agreements and policies at the national, international, bilateral and multilateral levels.

Third, in the post-cold-war world, nuclear-weapon States perhaps bear much heavier responsibility than ever before for the attainment of global security. A re-examination of their commitment under the NPT, especially under its article VI, might hence be most worthwhile in order to look into the most effective and globally acceptable ways and means of assuring total nuclear disarmament. In like manner, the security needs of the non-nuclear States are much greater today than those of the nuclear Powers. Therefore, the best way to prevent further acquisition, or temptations to acquire nuclear weapons, is to abolish the existing ones. As we all know, however, the declared nuclear-weapon States have made commendable declarations of security assurances. But the non-nuclear-weapon States very much desire that these declarations be transformed into a legally binding instrument. Such action would definitely reaffirm the responsibility of the nuclear Powers toward

(The President)

achieving nuclear disarmament and recommit these States to attain that goal. A legally binding document would be helpful, as it would remove all the fears that declarations are not binding. The latest offer by the nuclear Powers of negative security assurances to the Security Council is particularly noteworthy, and raises an enormous appetite for a big surprise at the NPT Conference. One hopes that this appetite can be satisfied.

Fourth, and as for the non-nuclear-weapon States of Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, many of them have indeed signed the NPT. They thus firmly argue that they deserve to receive security assurances for protection against the use, attack, or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the NPT want, it is clear, to have access to the transfer of science and technology for peaceful purposes, under the IAEA safeguards. Those States of the non-nuclear-weapons category which have not yet ratified the NPT obviously have concerns which are well known to this Conference, and have been taken note of. These States should nonetheless be encouraged to re-examine the value of the NPT as a most crucial and obvious contributor to global security.

Fifth, and in order to facilitate the negotiating process within CD, it would be best, I think, to exercise our political will to agree on a package of issues and measures to be taken within the CD's mandate.

If I may now speak on my own behalf, and as an interested participant in the work of this Conference and in a successful outcome of the NPT review Conference, I would expect that Conference to achieve at least the following. Firstly, extend the NPT, which is an invaluable instrument for global security. Secondly, encourage the nuclear Powers to continue their efforts toward achieving nuclear disarmament. Thirdly, encourage the CD, if the CTBT is not, as it appears, ready before the NPT Conference, to continue its efforts toward the conclusion of a universal, non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable CTBT. Such a treaty would augur very well for the nuclear disarmament process permanently and comprehensively banning all nuclear tests everywhere. Real hard work is under way, and one hopes that agreement can be reached as soon as practicable. In this connection I wish to recognize the valuable contributions made by Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico, and his successor, Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, to the test ban process. What a pity Ambassador Marín Bosch will be leaving us so soon. He reminds me of the late legend García Robles, and when I think of Ambassador García Robles, I am reminded of my maiden speech in the then Committee on Disarmament in the spring session of 1982.

Fourthly, the review Conference should encourage the revitalization, or creation as appropriate, of the necessary institutional mechanisms for the negotiation of the issues before the CD, which mechanisms would assist, facilitate and advance the negotiating process. The questions of CD expansion, improved and effective functioning, fissile material cut-off, agenda and status of negotiations within the CD, and the appointment or reappointment of special coordinators, coordinators or Friends of the Chair and the like, should be looked into very seriously. Those mechanisms which

(The President)

have been revitalized and are working have my fullest support and encouragement; and now that the Conference has agreed, on 23 March 1995, to create a new ad hoc committee on "cut-off" with a mandate as read out by Ambassador Shannon of Canada, I urge the CD to accelerate the consultative process so that the Chairman of the Committee can be appointed and start tackling, among others, and I underline among others, the problems of stocks and use of fissile materials, both of which are critical aspects of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. I congratulate Ambassador Shannon on his tireless efforts that have resulted in the consensus and thank him and the entire membership of the Conference for this welcome achievement.

Fifthly, the NPT review Conference should aim at achieving nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and elsewhere in the world.

As regards expansion in the CD's membership, Ambassador O'Sullivan's list of 23 new member States offers a good basis for a consensus which, I hope, will be achieved soon.

Before I conclude my statement, I should like to say something about the place and role of the mighty continent of Africa in the field of nuclear disarmament. Africa's contribution to the NPT Conference should not be underestimated. The contribution toward the non-proliferation regime is being made regionally through the African nuclear-weapon-free zone. It is noteworthy that out of the 54 African countries, 50 have already ratified the NPT. They include of course my own country, Kenya, which ratified the Treaty on Thursday, 11 June 1970. Furthermore, a large number of African States have concluded safeguards agreements with IAEA, as required under the NPT. Thus, Africa will be a crucial factor in the decision-making process during the NPT Conference in New York, given the large number of 50 States which have ratified the Treaty including all the African member States of this very Conference.

On the African front also, progress is being made at two levels: a text on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone has been drafted and the text will be considered and finalized at the next meeting of the Group of Experts set up jointly by OAU and the United Nations. The meeting will be held in Johannesburg, South Africa, from 29 May to 2 June 1995. And the expert Group will arrange for the treaty to be submitted to the OAU summit to be held in Adis Ababa in June of this year.

Given the great importance Africa attaches to this treaty, I believe that it will receive very serious consideration by the African heads of State or Government. And once endorsed by OAU, the treaty could be regarded as Africa's major contribution to the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations.

Thus, Your Excellencies and distinguished delegates, we have a formidable international agenda and challenging tasks lying ahead of us, on the eve of the NPT review Conference. I very much hope that you will do me the honour of being the proud President of this august body, under whose stewardship, it will be recorded, that consensus was reached within CD, and on the crucial issues before the NPT Conference. All of us, I repeat, individually and

(The President)

collectively, and the mighty Governments that we represent, and all the other relevant entities and personalities, have a duty to make the NPT Conference a resounding success. We are condemned to succeed, I believe, and as President of this Conference, I would very much prefer that we work out an honest, fair and meaningful package consensus on the issues and activities of the CD mandate which we could brag about at the NPT Conference, and beyond.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Cuba and Brazil and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Pérez Novoa.

Mr. PEREZ NOVOA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr President, distinguished colleagues, it is a pleasure for me to take the floor before this Conference at a time when it is being chaired by yourself, with whom we have maintained close and effective relations of cooperation within the United Nations. I wish you every success in your present duties. I would also like to express appreciation to your predecessors for their performance in the Chair.

Last September our delegation to this Conference announced the decision taken by the Cuban Government to sign the treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Today, I have pleasure in reporting that, in pursuance of the commitment entered into by President Fidel Castro Ruz on the occasion of the first Ibero-American summit in Guadalajara, the Cuban Government signed the above-mentioned Treaty on 25 March. On that occasion the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba made the following statement:

> "The Government of the Republic of Cuba declares that the obstacles which have thereto prevented full participation by the Republic of Cuba in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean still obtain and continue to affect Cuban security seriously. The only nuclear Power in this part of the world, the United States of America, is maintaining a policy of hostility against Cuba; it is stepping up its economic, trade and financial blockade; it is reinforcing its campaign against the country and perpetuating, by force and contrary to the will of our people, the illegal occupation of part of our national territory, through which its vessels transit bearing nuclear weapons, a problem whose solution will have to be regarded in the future as a precondition for our country's continued participation in the Treaty."

Cuba has always spoken out against all weapons of mass extermination. No country or group of countries should have a monopoly of such weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, which in our world bring about a privileged status which is in flagrant breach of the principle of the sovereign equality of States. We advocate the total disappearance of nuclear weapons as the sole means of embarking irrevocably on a path leading to lasting peace and security for all on an equal footing. Cuba, which has neither the resources, the technology nor the wish to develop such weapons, did not sign the Treaty of

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

Tlatelolco earlier for strictly moral reasons and because for many years it found itself in a regional context from which, with the honourable exception of Mexico, attempts were made to isolate it.

Today the situation is different. Major changes have come about on the continent. At present, not only do we have excellent relations with practically all the countries that belong to it, but these relations are becoming closer and more diversified and form an important part of the pattern of changes under way within our country. The remaining Latin American countries, which had not signed the Treaty until recently, have now done so, and as we stated, this fact was a further significant element in the adoption of our decision. It was these considerations which brought about and explain our decision to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco. What was an act of unilateral renunciation in another age, in exchange for which we encountered only incomprehension, hostility and threats, now forms part of a qualitatively different regional context.

This gesture by Cuba should therefore be construed as a further expression of my country's determination to become fully integrated in the Latin American and Caribbean community, and confirmation of our confidence in the future of a united Latin America. It is also the reaffirmation by the Government of the Republic of Cuba of the genuinely peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. We also consider that the verification of the obligations assumed by the nuclear Powers under Protocols I and II to this instrument would strengthen confidence that the region is indeed free from nuclear weapons, because renunciation of the nuclear option is not only an obligation on those countries which do not belong to the Security Council.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Saboia.

Mr. SABOIA (Brazil): Mr. President, allow me at the outset to express my delegation's warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. It is a great pleasure to see in such high office an illustrious representative of Kenya, a country with which Brazil enjoys a long tradition of friendly relations. We have only to benefit from your well-known diplomatic dexterity and commitment to the lofty goals of this Conference in the discharge of your duties. Be assured of the Brazilian delegation's full support in these endeavours. Let me also pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Hisami Kurokochi, whose deft handling of the complex issues before this body was further highlighted by the fact that she took up the presidential incumbency only days after assuming her new responsibilities in Geneva as the representative of Japan to the Conference. Ambassador Vattani of Italy also deserves our gratitude and appreciation for his effective leadership in conducting the initial phase of this session. Allow me also to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan as he takes part for the first time at the current session of the CD.

As we near the conclusion of the first part of the 1995 CD session, the Brazilian delegation feels it appropriate to share with members of and

(Mr. Saboia, Brazil)

participants in the CD our opinion and reflections on certain points and issues which have occupied us for the greater part of the past two months. Before doing so, I wish to take this opportunity to highlight a recent event that my Government finds of particular significance. I refer to the adherence by Cuba to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean - the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Together with the recent decisions on the part of Saint Lucia and Saint Kitts and Nevis to join Tlatelolco, the Cuban adherence means the Treaty and its protocols now apply to the whole Latin American and Caribbean region, rendering it in effect a nuclear-weapon-free zone subject to legally binding negative security assurances on the part of the five nuclear-weapon States. Since Brazil was the first country, back in the early 1960s, to propose to the United Nations General Assembly that our region be free of such weapons, it is for us especially gratifying to now witness the fulfilment of that ideal. We thus take great pleasure in congratulating the Cuban delegation for its Government's decision, and in welcoming that nation as a full party to the Treaty.

With regard to issues before the CD, I would first of all like to stress my delegation's satisfaction at the decision taken during our last plenary meeting whereby the Conference established an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices - the "cut-off" treaty. We owe this historic decision to Ambassador Gerald Shannon's untiring efforts as Special Coordinator for this issue, and no less to his skill, experience and boldness. The very fact that the CD is now in agreement to undertake negotiations on a cut-off treaty has by itself a deep political significance. It is heartening for the international community to know that this body is willing and able to move forward in banning the production of fissile material. However, for all our contentment with what was achieved last week, we must not lose sight of the sobering fact that the treaty's real effectiveness for international disarmament and non-proliferation will be determined by how it will deal not only with future production of fissile material, but also with the existing stockpiles of such material. It is the continued unchecked holdings of large quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium that poses the greatest horizontal and vertical proliferation risks. Moreover, how is one to effectively verify compliance with a ban on new production without adequate knowledge of the amounts already in existence? We believe these to be genuine concerns that bear directly upon the scope of the future treaty and therefore merit to be properly considered in the newly established ad hoc committee.

By the very action of establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on cut-off, this Conference has succeeded in sending a positive message with regard to tackling one fundamental issue subsumed under item 2 of its agenda. Such forthrightness, however, stands in stark contrast to what the CD has been able to achieve so far this session with regard to the establishment of other ad hoc committees or the appointment of special coordinators to deal with equally pressing issues on its agenda. We fail to understand why the decision to re-establish the ad hoc committees on prevention of a nuclear arms race in outer space and on negative security assurances, for which consensus seems secure, has so far not been brought before the Conference to take, or why

(Mr. Saboia, Brazil)

those issues which - regrettably - may not command consensus at this stage, such as the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments or the establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, have not been entrusted to special coordinators. We must also continue to strive for an urgent and appropriate solution to the problem of expansion. Those are questions and responsibilities this Conference and its presidency should not shirk from.

Amidst the frustration of watching this part of the session go by without decisions on many of these issues, we should nevertheless take heart in the prompt re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty - indeed a fitting attitude, given the high expectations held by the international community that such a long overdue treaty might finally be within grasp. These expectations were reflected in the consensus United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/70, which called upon the CD to proceed to a new phase of negotiation, and through which all CD members, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, were urged to negotiate intensively and to conclude such a treaty. We see the CTB treaty as essentially a political instrument. Commitment to its fundamental objectives and to its early conclusion, particularly on the part of the States with the capacity to test, is thus indispensable for progress to be achieved in the current negotiations. Continued leadership is instrumental in this regard. It has been encouraging to begin this year's session learning of the decisions by the United States to extend its moratorium on testing, to drop its earlier proposal of a special withdrawal provision, and to suggest inter-sessional work. We also welcome President Clinton's repeated calls for achieving a CTB treaty at the earliest possible time.

We believe useful work has overall been achieved this session up to now on the draft CTBT. The coming publication of a revised rolling text should help us gauge progress in terms of brackets removed and of newly drafted or revised text. We owe much of what was achieved to Ambassadors Ludwik Dembinski, Lars Norberg and Jaap Ramaker for the professional and efficient manner in which they have been fulfilling their duties as chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee and of the two working groups. We are also indebted to the numerous colleagues who have assisted them as Friends of the Chair or convenors for specific topics. Notwithstanding all these efforts, however, certain positions with regard to key articles being negotiated continue to give rise to concern. On the question of the scope of the treaty, for instance, it seems clear that proposals either to excessively broaden the extent of the ban or to introduce exceptions and limitations to it simply will not command general support, not to speak of the disquieting fact that some of them run counter to the very mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. Insistence on such proposals is indeed a worrisome development at this stage. Its only practical effect is that of stalling the whole negotiation, given the fundamental nature of the scope provisions. We believe the way forward on scope is best reflected in document CD/NTB/WP.222, circulated by the Australian delegation, whom we commend for this useful and timely initiative.

Another key element of the treaty is its article on entry into force. It is clear that the credibility and effectiveness of the treaty is contingent

(Mr. Saboia, Brazil)

upon its universality, or at least upon its acceptance among testing-capable States. The question here is to reconcile this reality with our equally imperative needs to keep the treaty non-discriminatory. We shall be examining carefully all proposals recently put forward which attend to these considerations.

As regards verification, we would first of all like to thank the experts led by Dr. Peter Marshall for all their efforts and for the reports they have recently issued on the results of their work. Even though it was not possible for the expert Group to achieve consensus on a single international monitoring system design as required under the mandate, we nevertheless believe their technical input to be useful for progress in the rolling text. Their reports no doubt provide a solid technical repository which can be drawn upon for the political decisions that are now needed for further drafting progress in the verification provisions of the rolling text. Until such decisions are made we see no reason for further technical discussions on the envisaged verification technologies. With regard to the characteristics of the IMS, we stand by our position that a sophisticated mechanism based on the four technologies such as the one contemplated must provide a solid basis for subsequent technical assessment of the nature of the events it detects, and that the organization must have access to all the required expertise and analytical capability at hand to carry out such an assessment.

It is clear that to make significant strides on issues such as the future CTBT organization, we will need to have a more precise idea on the treaty's verification regime, as well as on the basic undertakings States will be willing to make in articles such as scope and entry into force. For our part, Brazil favours a small, treaty-specific organization which would make full use of existing national or international technical capabilities and would work in close association with other international organizations or agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, by means of specific contracts or agreements. We believe this to be the most advantageous, efficient and cost-effective framework for the future organization.

Our overall assessment of the current first part of this year's session is that it has been encouraging in some respects but deeply disturbing in others. It is our conviction, though, that the negotiating opportunities are there to take. It would be unwise for us to let them pass by. The international community expects no less of us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Ola Dahlman, who will introduce the Group's progress report on its fortieth session. This report is contained in document CD/1296.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I appreciate this opportunity to report to you on the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group held from 20 February to 3 March 1995, with the participation of experts and representatives from 32 countries. The progress report of the meeting is contained in document CD/1296, which has

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

been distributed. I would from the outset like to acknowledge the eminent services by the secretariat that the Group has enjoyed throughout its session. We are truly satisfied at the way it handles our most technical material. The Ad Hoc Group's secretary, Ms. Mackby, has also been instrumental in facilitating increased participation in the Group's experiment through contacts with CD delegations.

The Ad Hoc Group meeting was devoted to reviewing the initial results of the large-scale technical test, usually referred to as GSETT-3, which started its full-scale phase on 1 January 1995. This test is an unprecedented effort to develop, test and evaluate new concepts for an experimental international seismic monitoring system.

I am pleased to report to you that the initial phase of this full-scale operation has started successfully. A fairly large system, containing globally distributed seismological stations, national data centres and an International Data Centre in Arlington, Virginia, United States of America, is up and running. The system is achieving its basic objectives of acquiring, storing, analysing and disseminating data. Bulletins containing the results of the analysis have also been regularly distributed from the International Data Centre to participating national data centres.

The successful start of the experiment is due to the dedicated efforts of hundreds of scientists and technicians at stations and national data centres around the world who have worked very hard to establish and to put their facilities into operation in a coordinated way. Particularly noteworthy is the successful effort to get the International Data Centre into a smooth on-line operation on time.

It is still too early to draw any definite conclusions on the results of GSETT-3 as it has just started. The GSE has established, as you may recall, a working group to continuously evaluate the test as it progresses and the results it produces. The elaborations during the Ad Hoc Group's meeting were based on a preliminary report from this working group and on similar reports from the working groups on planning and operations. A summary of these reports is annexed to the progress report.

The Group of Scientific Experts envisages a network of 60 primary or alpha stations for GSETT-3. The alpha stations comprise the basic network that detects the events. Today we have 49 out of these 60 stations committed, meaning that the countries have made a formal commitment to submit data from those stations. I do hope that the Group, with your cooperation, will be able to obtain participation of the remaining 11 stations as well. Not all of the committed stations are, however, today in operation or connected on-line to the International Data Centre, and in some cases substantial technical work remains. The other network is the supplemental network, which we call the beta network. Here the Group of Scientific Experts has not designed any particular station configuration but we anticipate a well-distributed network of some 150 stations. Today we have 95 such stations committed. Most of these stations are, however, located in Europe and North America, which means that a fair amount of additional beta stations are still needed to

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

obtain adequate geographical coverage. Efforts are still under way to obtain commitments for more such stations, primarily in the southern hemisphere.

When it comes to actual operation, GSETT-3 had by 1 March 76 stations which were actually reporting data on line. An annex to the progress report contains a map showing the locations of the stations. Thirty-two of these stations are alpha stations and 44 are beta stations. The alpha stations are reporting continuously to the International Data Centre, whereas data from the beta stations are automatically requested by the International Data Centres when needed. Quite a substantial amount of information goes into the International Data Centre; it corresponds to about 1 million pages of information every day. The system detects on an average some 60 seismic events every day. Nature has, however, already tested the system by providing more than 200 earthquakes in one single day following a large quake off the coast of New Zealand.

The basic idea with this system and in particular with the International Data Centre is to draw information important for CTBT verification out of this huge amount of reported original data and to condense this information down to something that is manageable - a couple of pages per day. The International Data Centre has been doing an excellent job in actually achieving that. It has managed to cope with this large data flow and to produce bulletins as scheduled. An automatic report is going out within one hour after the occurrence of an event and a more comprehensive bulletin, which is based on analysis by experts, goes out after two days. This information is distributed to the national data centres for their evaluation and assessment.

The International Data Centre is also offering custom-made bulletins that contain just the information that is of interest to a particular participant. The GSETT-3 International Data Centre is not providing identification of detected seismic events, but will soon calculate and compile agreed parameters, which characterize the observed signals and which may assist participating countries in identifying the source of the event.

The International Data Centre, which is a key facility for GSETT-3, has presently a staff of 47 people; 10 of these are internationally recruited for limited time. The Group is most satisfied to have this international staffing of the Centre, which contributes to the spreading of knowledge about International Data Centre operations to many countries. The operation at the International Data Centre is continuously expanding and improving as more and more stations are coming on line. I am also pleased to report that the communication system that used to be a bottleneck is now functioning very well and we now have on-line computer-to-computer connections between essentially all the participants in the experiment.

In setting up such a large experiment as GSETT-3 you need extensive documentation to advise the various operators in the system at the stations, the International Data Centre and the national data centres on what they should do. The Group has developed extended documentation that could also be a good basis for establishing the operational manuals to guide the practical operation of the IMS system that you finally decide to establish.

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The system being tested during GSETT-3 is evolutionary in nature. Additional stations, improved instrumentation and new processing methods are expected to be incorporated as the test progresses. The GSE is conducting ongoing assessment of various system components during GSETT-3. Results will be continually incorporated into the system to improve its performance so that the system will be capable of providing the Conference on Disarmament with information and experience relevant to the establishment and operation of a future system for monitoring a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Group of Scientific Experts considers that the GSETT-3 system is already providing an infrastructure in the form of technical facilities, including education and training of personnel, which would facilitate the implementation of a monitoring system. GSETT-3 is also providing experience with data services that will be needed by the national verification programmes of the participating States.

GSETT-3 has proven to be useful for the work conducted by the International Monitoring System Expert Group in evaluating options for a future seismic monitoring system. While the scope of GSETT-3 is limited to seismic monitoring, the GSETT-3 system design is flexible enough to incorporate the collection, archiving and distribution of data also from non-seismic techniques such as radioactivity, hydroacoustics and infrasound.

The Group also discussed its future plans for GSETT-3. The Group agreed that continuation of GSETT-3 for an extended period of time along the operational plans outlined in CD/1254 would be important to progressively modify the system to meet the international monitoring system (IMS) design, as decisions are made by the CD on the seismic component of a future IMS. This would also ensure continued training of an international staff and continued provision of practical advice to the CD. In addition, the GSE could cooperate in experiments to demonstrate the synergy between the seismic IMS and other non-seismic IMS components, if requested by the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee. For financial planning purposes, countries participating in GSETT-3 should be prepared to support their national facilities and communications links at least through 1996.

It was noted that a technical upgrade is needed for some of the stations envisioned as part of the GSETT-3 monitoring network (CD/1254). It is also of great importance to ensure financial resources for continuous data transmission from existing stations and for the establishment and operation of new stations in areas where the GSETT-3 coverage today is inadequate. Countries are encouraged to support by providing technical and financial assistance in these areas to other countries whose participation is essential.

As to the interaction with the nuclear test ban Committee, the Ad Hoc Group received and appreciated a briefing from the Chairman of its Working Group on Verification. Upon invitation by the Chairman, I gave a presentation to the Working Group on the GSETT-3 experiment.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 7 to 18 August 1995. The main task during the next session will be to review and evaluate results

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from the full-scale phase of GSETT-3. The Group is prepared to meet during the second part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament if so requested by the CD in view of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Dr. Dahlman for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. With regard to the recommendation contained in paragraph 11 of document CD/1296 to the effect that the next session of the Ad Hoc Group will be held from 7 to 18 August 1995, these dates will have to be agreed to by the Conference and it is my intention to ask for such a decision to be taken at the plenary next Thursday, 6 April.

I do not have any more speakers on my list. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor in my capacity as representative of the depositary Government for the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco). But before doing so allow me to congratulate you on taking up the post of President of the Conference and to extend to you the wholehearted cooperation of the Mexican delegation. We wish to place on record our appreciation for the way in which the distinguished representative of Japan presided over our work in the past four weeks. We welcome the colleagues who have recently arrived, including of course Ambassador Munir Akram of Pakistan, who took his place in this room this morning.

We listened with particular satisfaction this morning to the statement by the distinguished representative of Cuba, our friend Ambassador José Pérez Novoa. We welcome the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco by Cuba on 25 March, on the very eve of the fourteenth session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), which is taking place this week in Viña del Mar in Chile. This completes the cycle which began in 1967 with the opening for signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region. As the Treaty now comes into full effect for Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and with the accession last week by Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint Lucia, the zone of application of the Treaty covers 25 million square kilometres inhabited by more than 450 million human beings. Mexico welcomed this event of particular significance for our entire region in the person of my country's Minister for Foreign Affairs, José Angel Gurría, at the signing ceremony in Havana. In the words of the Foreign Minister, "Mexico values Cuba's accession to the Treaty of Tlatelolco as a renewed demonstration of Cuba's willingness to subscribe to the consensus positions reached by Latin America and the Caribbean", and he added that this was "clear proof of Cuba's resolve to stress dialogue and negotiation as essential elements of international coexistence".

For more than 30 years the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have been convinced that military denuclearization is the right path for achieving a truly secure world. The consolidation of a nuclear-weapon-free

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zone in our region is the clearest evidence of our rejection of a concept of peace which is based on an alleged nuclear balance or a threat of mutual annihilation. We congratulate the Cuban Government on its decision to join an authentic and non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime for nuclear weapons. Our region has practised what it preaches. Alfonso García Robles would be very pleased.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada.

Mr. BISHOP (Canada): Mr. President, my delegation would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the CD presidency at this important period and to assure you of my delegation's full support throughout your presidency. I would also like to pay tribute to the effective and productive way in which your predecessor, Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan, undertook her duties over the last month, especially as a newcomer here. My delegation would also like to thank both you and Ambassador Saboia for the kind remarks directed towards Ambassador Shannon and assure you both that they will, of course, be conveyed to him.

The purpose of my asking for the floor today is simply to take the opportunity to announce that my delegation is in the process of having distributed the papers from the Toronto Cut-off Workshop which took place from 16 to 19 January 1995. They are presented with the particular attention of allowing those who could not be present to benefit from the results of the Workshop. The Canadian Government would like to express special thanks to those here who presented papers at the Workshop and otherwise contributed to the success there.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. This completes the list of speakers for today.

As delegations are aware, despite the measure of progress already achieved in the Conference so far, there remain a number of pending issues relating to the Presidential statement covering the agenda and organization of the 1995 session. These pending issues continue to be the subject of intensive consultations and I am sure that with further effort and good will the Conference will succeed in resolving them.

The secretariat has, at my request, circulated a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference during next week, which will also be the last week of the first part of its 1995 session. This was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, is tentative and subject to change, if necessary. On this basis, may I consider that the timetable is acceptable to the Conference? This seems to be the case.

The next meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 6 April 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.